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At the time of Stalin's death there were those who thought (or at least
hoped) that the U.S.S.R. would change and become more reasonable in its foreign
policy, thus reducing international tension. The period of interest to this
paper then is from Stalin's death to the Twentieth Party Congress when Commu-
nist Party First Secretary Khrushchev proclaimed that war between communists
and capitalists was no longer inevitable. The period of interest is broken
into five parts: a background section to set the world stage before Stalin's
death; the period from Stalin's death to the Berlin Foreign Ministers Confer-
ence (January, 1954); the period beginning with the Berlin Conference and
ending with the defeat of the EDC treaty (August 30, 1954); the period from
the EDC treaty defeat to the Federal Republic of Germany's accession to NATO
(May 6, 1955); and finally the period after the Germans' NATO accession to the
Twentieth Party Congress.
This paper proposes to examine the above period in an effort to better
understand its events and the changes that evolved in the Soviet approach to
the European and world situation.
The English translation of all Soviet materials used was obtained from
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press . Where that was unavailable, the
Department of State Bulletin
,






World Communism is the ultimate goal of the Soviet leaders,
in the sense of their aspiration. This aim is based on expec-
tations derived from the Marxist-Leninist view of history; it
also nourishes a striving for power. Nonetheless, while seeking
to expand their influence and power into the non-Communist
world, the Soviet leaders give primary attention to maintaining




At the end of World War II with Germany defeated, the Soviet Union had
never been so strong— the European (capitalist) economy was in shambles and
yet, as Henry Kissinger writes in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy :
At the precise moment when Soviet armies stood in the center
of a war-wrecked Europe and Lenin's prophecies of the doom of
capitalism seemed on the verge of being fulfilled, a new weapon
appeared far transcending in power anything previously known.
Was the dialectic of history so fragile that it could be upset
by a new technological discovery? Was this to be the result
of twenty years of brutal repression and deprivation and of
four years of cataclysmic war that at its end the capitalist
enemy should emerge with a weapon which could imperil the
Soviet state as never before?!
To offset this nuclear weakness, the U.S.S.R. had the Red Army which
could sweep over Europe quite rapidly, thus Europe represented Stalin's
"hostage" against precipitous action by the United States. Though Stalin
could do nothing immediately about the U.S.'s exclusive possession of the
Atomic bomb, he felt he could "undermine the will to use it by a world-wide
campaign against the horrors of nuclear warfare."-5 That was precisely what he
Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 362.
Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1966), p. 107.
Kissinger, p. 363.

endeavored to do (i.e., ban-the-bomb sloganeering, the Stockholm Peace Appeal,
and the World Peace Council).
Soviet ideology demands continual calculation of the balance of power
(relation of forces
—
sootnoshenie sil ) in order to determine whether to advance
or retreat and this must be done continuously since "any equilibrium or rela-
tion is of indefinite, but temporary duration.'
With these ideas in mind one can understand why it was necessary for
Stalin to consolidate Eastern Europe (thus moving any future war front as far
East as possible) and yet not threaten the U.S. to the extent that it might
launch a nuclear strike.
Certainly the promulgation of the Truman doctrine and Marshall plan
greatly disturbed Stalin, as these actions would serve to strengthen the West.
The potential of the Brussels Pact plus an awareness that the U.S. was growing
more reluctant than ever to consider the use of nuclear weapons may have stim-
ulated Stalin to attempt to get complete control of Berlin (the Berlin Block-
ade) before the West became stronger. Stalr'.n was partially right in that the
U.S. did not use nuclear, or even conventional, weapons. Though the U.S.S.R.
was not attacked, the blockade did not drive the West out; it had the opposite
effect. Just as the Western concern over Czechoslovakia (1948) had led to the
Brussels Pact; the Berlin blockade served as a catalyst for the creation of
NATO. The formation of NATO meant a favorable shift of the "relation of
4
Marshal D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 22, 131-134.
5
Garthoff, p. 79, 94.
Jan Librach, The Rise of the Soviet Empire (Revised edition; New York
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1965), p. 178-179.

forces for the West in Europe just as the U.S.S.R. was obtaining the Atomic
bomb . '
In the Far East where the West was not so strong (after all it let the
Chinese Communists take over China) and the U.S. had indicated it would not
defend Korea, the U.S.S.R. through the vehicle of the North Korean Army invaded
South Korea only to discover the U.S.A. was as interested in "containment" in
the Far East as it was in Europe. Once again this had the effect in Europe
of pulling the NATO alliance even closer together; so close that the rearma-
ment of Western Germany came to be a feasible concern of NATO planning despite
the natural French hostility to such an idea. This presented a new concern to
the Soviets. If West Germany were rearmed and coupled with NATO forces
(through the EDC or any other plan the West might devise) , then the West might
not only be able to thwart any Red Army invasion of Europe, but it might also
o
produce a striking force with which the West could invade Eastern Europe.
By mid-February, 1952, French and West German parliamentary approval had
been secured ^ and in Lisbon (February 20-February 25) the North Atlantic
Council (NATO) set out ambitious guidelines for a NATO military force:
50 divisions, 4000 aircraft, and strong naval forces by the
end of 1952 11
'Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Frederick A.






Herbert S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (Revised edition; New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 92-93, 125-126.
F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1963 (Stanford
Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 138, 152, 155. W. Germany - February 8,
1952; France - February 19, 1952.
NATO: Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization , NATO Infor-
mation Service, Paris? 1949?, p. 26.

Twelve of these divisions were to be German within a European army in the
European Defense Community (EDC). 1 ^
Hoping that the "capitalists' contradictions" would outweigh their unity,
the U.S.S.R. in a note on March 10, 1952 presented the Big Three 13 a proposal
urging immediate discussion of the question of a peace treaty with Germany
"with a view to preparing in the nearest future an agreed draft peace
treaty. "^ This peace treaty was to have "direct participation of Germany in
the form of an all-German Government." 15 Enclosed with this note was a Soviet
draft for a peace treaty. The draft included a theme which was to become
quite familiar in the years to come:
Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany has an important
significance for the strengthening of peace in Europe. A peace
treaty with Germany will permit final decision of questions
which have arisen as a consequence of the second world war.
The European states which have suffered from German aggression,
particularly the neighbors of Germany, have a vital interest in
the solution of these questions. Conclusion of a peace treaty
with Germany will aid improvement of the international situation
as a whole and at the same time aid the establishment of a
lasting peace.
The necessity of hastening the conclusion of a peace treaty
with Germany is required by the fact that the danger of re-
establishment of German militarism which has twice unleashed
world wars has not been eliminated in as much as appropriate
provisions of the Potsdam conference still remain unfilled. A
peace treaty with Germany must guarantee elimination of the




The Big Three are France, U.K., and U.S.A.; the Big Four are France,
U.K., U.S.A., and U.S.S.R. All notes concerning the Big Three were sent to
each one individually and replied to individually, but since the language is
the same in all cases, this paper will refer to notes as "to" or "from the Big
Three."
14
Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1952 (New York: Harper and





All armed forces of occupying powers were to be withdrawn within one
year of the peace treaty's entry into force and Germany was to be rearmed,
but neutral. Also, "The territory of Germany is defined by the borders estab-
lished by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference of the Great Powers."-1-'
Due to the ambiguities of the provisions for a German government and proposals
such as the territory settlement, the Big Three were not interested in the
Soviet proposal. The Big Three felt the Potsdam Conference left the territory
boundaries to be decided in the final peace treaty negotiations, but the
Soviets had considered that a closed issue once the Potsdam Conference allowed
them to occupy the Eastern German lands. After some consideration the Big
Three replied in their note of March 25, 1952. The Big Three called for free
elections to set up an all-German government and proposed that such a govern-
ment should have the freedom "both before and after the conclusion of a peace
treaty to enter into associations compatible with the principles and purposes
of the United Nations (i.e., NATO, EDC)." 18
The Soviets quickly replied to the Big Three on April 9, 1952 with
another call for a Four Power conference to discuss a German peace treaty and
formation of an all-German Government.
It is just now that the question is being decided whether
Germany will be reestablished as a united, independent, peace-
loving state entering into the family of peace-loving peoples
of Europe or whether the division of Germany, and connected
with it the threat of war in Europe, will remain. 19
Apparently the Soviets were getting more and more concerned as the time of













The Big Three replied on May 13, 1952 in a note that declared that more
concrete proposals were necessary before the Big Three could proceed with any
negotiations. Further they made a detailed proposal for starting the process
in motion to conduct free elections in all of Germany. 20 The Soviets initiated
another note to the Big Three on May 24, 1952 calling for immediate talks on a
German peace treaty. -1-
On May 27 the European Defense Community treaty was signed by France,
West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Also a protocol
to the NATO treaty was signed to include EDC members under NATO protection. 22
On July 10, 1952 the Big Three replied to the May 24 Soviet note by call-
ing for a Four Power meeting to set up a Commission to investigate to determine
whether the conditions necessary for free elections exist, and to reach agree-
ment on formation of an all German-government. -*
On August 23, 1952 the Soviets countered with a call for a meeting in
October and proposed that "the German Democratic Republic and the German
Federal Republic take part in a meeting to examine appropriate questions. ^
The Big Three responded one month later with a call for a Four Power meeting
with free elections as the primary issue. 25
Preparation for the XIX Party Congress (first since before World War II
















the French cabinet appeared confident enough of its strength to secure ratifi-
cation of the EDC treaty caused the Soviets to discontinue diplomatic efforts
for the rest of the year.^6
Throughout 1952, in addition to the German situation, the Big Three had
also attempted to achieve some resolution of the unsettled Austrian peace
treaty. The U.S.S.R. linked the Austrian question with the Trieste situation
and avoided any meetings on the Austrian settlement.
The XIX Party Congress was held from October 5 - October 15, 1952. The
three major documents of the Congress were: Stalin's "Economic Problems of
Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," Malenkov's Central Committee report, and Stalin's
Concluding Remarks. ' Stalin's "Economic Problems ..." and Malenkov's speech
both stressed the contradictions between capitalists being at least as great
as those between capitalism and Communism; and the conclusion that the next
war would be between capitalist states. ° Stalin's Concluding Remarks gave
emphasis to the peaceful nature of the U.S.S.R.
With the U.S. detonation of a hydrogen bomb (technically, thermonuclear
device) on November 1, 1952, " the U.S.S.R. was more concerned than ever about
the relation of forces (i.e., deterrence, likelihood of a new war). More and
more the Soviet foreign policy seemed interested in world peace and "what to
do until the deterrent comes. "™ Soviet international efforts waned in early
26Shulman, p. 193.
27
Leo Gruliow (ed.), Current Soviet Policies , Vol. I, (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1953), p. 1-20, 99-124, 235-236, respectively.




p. 7-8 and p. 101-106, respectively.
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Richard P. Stebbins, e_t al, The United States in World Affairs, 1952




1953 probably because of Stalin's involvement with the "Doctor's Plot" and other
aspects of a new purge he was planning. 31
Against this background in March, 1953, Stalin died; thus both the U.S.A.
32and U.S.S.R. had new leadership and new approaches to their foreign relations.
This paper will now trace the foreign relations of these two countries up to
the Twentieth Party Congress as they vied for control of the future of Europe,
especially their struggle over Germany. The reader will observe that disarma-
ment, though often linked with this period, is mentioned only in passing. This
was a deliberate omission as disarmament only clouds the issues involved, and
as Jan Librach observed in 1965: "Disarmament negotiations, within the frame-
work of the United Nations, or in various ad hoc bodies, were resumed in 1946.
For the next seventeen years, their practical result was virtually nil.'
See Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1959), p. 249-258.
32
Leo Gruliow in the Introduction, p. iv, of Current Soviet Policies , I.
observed that the death of Stalin did not signal a change in foreign policy.
The conciliatory gestures of the new regime were a continuation of the policy
Stalin had laid down several years previously, only the tactics were different,
This observation was made April 22, 1953.
33
Librach, p. 243. Alvin Z. Rubinstein (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the
Soviet Union (2nd Ed; New York: Random House, 1966), p. 310-311, draws the
same conclusion.

II. OUT OF STALIN'S BLIND ALLEY
Joseph Stalin died on March 6, 1953, and the new "collective leadership"
immediately came under careful observation by a world hoping for a relaxation
of international tensions. These hopes were soon realized, though indirectly
as the Chinese Communists on March 28, 1953 indicated their acceptance of the
U.S. proposal (February 22) on exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war
and further indicated willingness to resume armistice negotiations. (This
action led to renewed negotiations and finally the signing of the Korean
armistice agreement on July 27, 1953. ) With this as a beginning, Western
hopes for further Soviet foreign policy changes seemed to be well-founded.
With these hopes in mind, President Eisenhower on April 16 made a major
foreign policy speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. The
President reviewed U.S. foreign policy precepts emphasizing the principles of
just peace and self-determination then went on to suggest that the opportunity
for future agreements depended on the Soviet Union.
The world knows that an era ended with the death of
Joseph Stalin....
Its (Soviet Union's) future is, in great part, its own
to make ....
With all who will work in good faith toward such a peace
(neither partial nor punitive), we are ready, with renewed
resolve, to strive to redeem the near-lost hopes of our
day. 5
^Current Soviet Policies , I, p. 246-247.
department of State Bulletin , Vol. XXVIII, April 6, 1953, p. 494-495
(Hereinafter referred to as State Bulletin .)
3Ibid. , Vol. XXIX, August 3, 1953, p. 132-140.






Two days later Secretary of State Dulles, in a speech to the American
Society of Newspaper Editors stressed the need for renewing interest in the
European Defense Community treaty ratification efforts and the unity of
Western Europe (NATO), and the prospects for peace that President Eisenhower's
speech offered. Following this same theme, Prime Minister Churchill stated
on May 11, 1953 in a House of Commons speech concerning recent foreign affairs:
The supreme event. . .is ... the change of attitude and, as
we all hope, of mood which has taken place in the Soviet
domains and particularly in the Kremlin since the death of
Stalin. 7
After recalling the 1925 Locarno Treaty and suggesting a modern parallel, he
went on to suggest "that a conference on the highest level should take place
o
between the leading Powers without delay."
The hopes of the West were subdued by the U.S.S.R. statement that it was
q
not interested in attending an Austrian Treaty meeting on May 27. The impetus
for this attempt to restart Austrian talks had come from the United Nations
resolution of December 20, 1952 urging renewed efforts on Austria. The Big
Three responded on June 11 in a note that refused to accept the Soviet position
and asked the Soviet Government to state "the exact text" that it was prepared
to sign. Another setback to efforts for settlement of European problems
occurred when the Soviet satellites experienced internal riots in June—first
12



















Vol. XXVIII, June 22, 1953, p. 873-874.
12
Robert Bass, Eastern Europe: A New Orbit ? (Headline Series No. 168;
New York: Foreign Policy Association, December, 1964), p. 17.

11
The intervention of Soviet troops was required to quell the East Berlin riots
and this led to charges and countercharges between the U.S.S.R. and Big Three
n
Commandants in Berlin.
Despite the above problems, the Big Three Foreign Ministers meeting of
July 10 - 14 decided to continue attempts to reopen negotiations with the
Soviet Union on both the German and the Austrian questions. On July 15 the
Big Three delivered a note to the U.S.S.R. proposing a Big Four Foreign
Ministers 1 meeting in late September on the subjects of: free elections in
Germany, a free all-German Government, and agreement on the Austrian Treaty.
On July 30 the U.S.S.R. answered the Big Three note of June 11 by ignoring the
request and asking whether the Big Three were ready to set aside their "abbre-
viated treaty" proposal. The U.S.S.R. also replied on August 4 to the Big
Three note of July 15 by expanding the concept of the proposed Foreign Minis-
ters' conference to include consideration "of measures which promote a general
lessening of tension in international relations, including. .. (the) impermissi-
bility of foreign military bases on territory of other states ." (Underlining
mine.) Additionally the note stated:
...It also follows that the participation of the Chinese
Peoples' Republic is necessary in a discussion of questions
concerning measures for lessening tension in international
relations . -*-'
With reference to the Austrian treaty the U.S.S.R. pointed out:
1 3State Bulletin
,
Vol. XXVIII, June 29, 1953, p. 89 7-898, and Vol. XXIX,
July 6, 1953, p. 8-9.
14State Bulletin
,




16Ibid., August 31, 1953, p. 282-283.
17Ibid. , September 14, 1953, p. 352.

12
It goes without saying that possible successes in settlement
of the German problem could also contribute to a decision of
the Austrian treaty as well. 18
On August 8, 1953 Premier Malenkov gave a major speech to the Supreme So-
viet of the U.S.S.R. which called for some changes in foreign policy and a
major departure from previous domestic policy:
Hitherto we have not had the opportunity to develop light
and food industry at the same rate as heavy industry. Now we
can and consequently we must accelerate the development of
light industry in every way in the interests of securing a
faster rise in the living standard and cultural levels of the
people. y (Underlining mine.)
Then in a move apparently designed to indicate that the U.S.S.R. had the
deterrent answer to the U.S. hydrogen bomb threat and thus quiet the anxiety
of any who might have felt the new domestic policy would weaken Soviet defenses,
Malenkov announced:
The government considers it necessary to report to the Supreme
Soviet that the United States has no monopoly of production of
the hydrogen bomb.
It is necessary to realize that in the present configuration
of forces and in the face of the firm resolve of the Soviet
Union and the countries of the democratic camp to defend their
vital interests in the international arena, application of the
policy of peaceful coexistence of the two systems is the duty
not only of the democratic camp but of all countries.'20
This announcement prior to initial testing was another departure by the new
"leadership" from Stalinist policies; in fact Stalin did not even announce
9 9





19The Current Digest of the Soviet Press , September 5, 1953, p. 4.
(Hereinafter referred to as Current Digest .)
20Ibid.
,
p. 11, p. 26.
91
The term, leadership, will be used to generally refer to the Presidium
of the Party and other influential people who were involved in the succession
struggle, but are not clearly identified in any sources that this writer has
reviewed.
9 9
Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 369.

13




In speaking of other foreign policy matters, Malenkov viewed the Korean
truce as a Soviet victory. The riots in East Berlin "could have led to
extremely serious international consequences," but "the liquidation of the
Berlin venture" also signified "an important victory for the cause of peace."
Normalization of relations with Yugoslavia and Greece was put forth as a goal,
while renewed diplomatic relations with Israel was described as another Soviet
success in easing general international tension. The United States' attitude
and policies were blamed for the cold war, while the Soviet Union's "general
line in the sphere of foreign policy" was "the cause of strengthening peace
25
and safeguarding the security of the peoples."
On August 15 the U.S.S.R. initiated a new note to the Big Three and pro-
posed a peace conference on Germany be held within six months with representa-
tives of the existing East and West German governments to act on behalf of
Germany until a provisional all-German government could be formed. Further,
the East and West German parliaments could act as a Provisional government with
only limited functions until "creation of an all-German Government on the basis
of really free all-German elections." 27 Explanation of the phrase, really free
all-German elections, then was provided:
A chief task of the provisional all-German Government further-
more must be the preparation and carrying out of all-German free
23













elections as a result of which the German people itself
without interference of foreign powers will decide the
question of social and state structure in a democratic
p Q
Germany. z- °
In other words, no impartial international supervision was to be permitted.
"Free elections" were never to be held unless clearly the conditions favored
the Communists. This new German state was to be rearmed, but be neutral. The
Soviets then launched a propaganda effort to immediately affect the upcoming
West German elections (September 6) by suggesting the financial burden of both
of the German governments be eased by ending reparations payments on January lj
1954 and by reducing the charges to each German government for occupation
troops to not more than five per cent of the East and West German state bud-
gets and in any event not more than the occupation expenditures of 1949 "when
the extent of the occupational expenditures had not yet been affected by the
formation of the North Atlantic Bloc." The significance of this becomes
clear when one realizes the Federal German Republic paid 35% of its budget for
on
occupation troops and the Big Three were already straining to pay for their
military forces, therefore unlikely to reduce the German payments.
On August 17 the Big Three invited the U.S.S.R. to an Austrian Treaty
meeting on August 31. The Big Three agreed to drop their proposed "abbre-
viated treaty" in order to maximize the opportunity for agreement on a treaty
draft. The U.S.S.R. did not accept the invitation to attend the August 31
meeting.
28T , . ,Ibid.
29 Ibid.
3QNew Times , 1953, No. 36, September 2, 1953, p. 12.
31State Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, August 31, 1953, p. 282

15
Following up on its own proposal for reducing German expenses, the
U.S.S.R. met in Moscow with representatives of the German Democratic Republic
August 20 - 22 and then issued a communique and protocol concerning agreements
32
on economic and diplomatic relations. The effect of the negotiations was to
eliminate several German debts, reduce other German payments, provide a gener-
ous loan, and expand the current trade agreement. Agreement to exchange of
ambassadors, thus upgrading the respective diplomatic missions to embassies,
constituted the diplomatic aspect of the negotiations. Apparently the June
riots and continuing financial problems of the East Germans made this abso-
lutely necessary and the forthcoming German elections offered a possible
political advantage to such action at this time. Worthy of note is the fact
34
that the Soviets retained control of the East German uranium mines.
On September 2 the Big Three reply to the Soviet August notes refused to
accept the Soviet justification for the Chinese Peoples' Republic attending
a future conference, denied that an Austrian solution needed to be linked with
a German solution, and stated that "progress is more likely to be made by
35(face to face) discussion. .. than by a further exchange of notes." The Soviet
Government was then invited to a Big Four Foreign Ministers conference at
Lugano, Switzerland on October 15. The suggestion of discussion, vice notes,
Current Digest
, October 3, 1953, p. 6-7.
33The U.S.S.R. cancelled reparations of $2,537,000,000. in 1938 world
prices, gave the GDR properties worth 2,700,000,000 marks, cancelled a
430,000,000 mark debt on 66 industrial enterprises, limited occupation costs
to a maximum of 5% of the GDR budget (West Germany's costs were about 35%),
and made a 590 million ruble trade agreement and a 485 million ruble loan.
Current Digest
,
October 3, 1953, p. 6-7, contains the full text of the
agreement.
34
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee
on National Security and International Operations, The Warsaw Pact: Its Role
In Soviet Bloc Affairs
,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p. 13.
35State Bulletin
,
Vol. XXIX, September 14, 1953, p. 351-352.
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went unheeded and more notes were exchanged with no new proposals being made
by either side. The principal points of contention were the matters of the
Chinese People's Republic participation and the scope of the conference; the
Big Three wanted a Big Four conference on European problems, while the U.S.S.R.
wanted European problems to be merely one aspect of a Five Power conference.
The Soviet Union finally gave in on November 26 to the Western intransigence
37
and proposed a Big Four Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin. (The U.S. State
Department's view was that the foreign policy debate in the French parliament
was the event that resulted in the Soviet acceptance of the West's position,
OO
in hopes that EDC ratification would be held up. If so, it worked.) In the
same note, the U.S.S.R. declared that it would bring up the matter of a five
power conference at the Big Four meeting. After three more notes on convening
date, the Foreign Ministers Conference was set for Berlin on January 25,
1954. 39
The Big Three leaders met in Bermuda from the Ath to the 7th of December,
1953 and renewed their support of EDC and NATO. President Eisenhower
addressed the United Nations the next day and discussed nuclear power for
0£
For the texts of the notes, see State Bulletins
,
Vol. XXIX, as follows:
Soviet note of September 28 p. 548-550.
Big Three note of October 18 p. 547-548.
Soviet Note of November 3 p. 745-748.
Big Three note of November 16 p. 745.
37State Bulletin
,
Vol. XXIX, December 21, 1953, p. 853-854.
38Ibid. , December 7, 1953, p. 786.
39The Big Three note of December 8 proposed January 4. (See State
Bulletin
, Vol. XXIX, December 21, 1953, p. 853.) The Soviet note of December
26 proposed January 25. (See State Bulletin
,
Vol. XXX, January 11, 1954,





Vol. XXIX, December 21, 1953, p. 851-852.
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peace and for war. He spoke of "the probability of civilization destroyed
—
the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind..." "Surely no sane
member of the human race could discover victory in such desolation." He then
proposed an International Atomic Energy Agency be set up under the aegis of the
United Nations to promote peaceful uses of nuclear power.
In seeming contradiction to President Eisenhower's "atoms for peace"
speech of December 8, 1953, Secretary of State Dulles made a tough speech to
the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954. This became known as the
"massive retaliation" speech because of the following statements:
We want for ourselves and the other free nations, a maximum
deterrent at a bearable cost....
Local defense will always be important. But there is no
local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower
of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by
the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power . Otherwise,
for example, a potential aggressor, who is glutted with man-
power, might be tempted to attack in confidence that resistance
would be confined to manpower. He might be tempted to attack
in places where his superiority was decisive....
The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be
willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means
of its own choosing....
The basic decision (that has changed military planning in
the U.S.) was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to
retaliate
,
instantly, by means and at places of our choosing....
As a result it is now possible to get, and share, more basic
security at less cost. ^ (Underlining mine.)
Ratification of the EDC received a specific comment:
Until the goals of EDC are achieved, NATO, and indeed
future peace, are in jeopardy. ^3
With this busy ten months since the death of Stalin as a prelude, the Big
Four Foreign Ministers' meeting convened on January 25, 1954. Before consider-











died in March and a succession struggle in the U.S.S.R. then developed in
which Malenkov appeared to have the upper hand as evidenced by his speech on
August 8. The Korean War armistice had finally been signed and Soviet satel-
lites had demonstrated to some degree their internal unrest, and the U.S.S.R.
had come to the financial assistance (rescue?) of the German Democratic Re-
public. Soviet efforts for increased recognition of the importance and legiti-
macy of the Chinese Peoples' Republic and the German Democratic Republic had
been to no avail. Surprise, but not alarm, had resulted in the West from the
Soviet announcement of their hydrogen bomb (thermonuclear) capability.
Prime Minister Churchill's call for a top level conference had not been an-
swered, but for the first time since 1949 the Big Four Foreign Ministers were
to sit down and discuss the problems of Germany and Austria. Hope for some
kind of easing of European tensions existed for the first time since the end
of World War II.
^For an impression of the alarm and concern over the Soviet's first
atom bomb test (1949), read Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense Of the National
Interest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).
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III. ALL EYES ON FRANCE
The second period opens with the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers
and continues through the defeat of the EDC treaty in the French Parliament.
The Berlin Conference lasted from January 25 to February 18, 1954. It was the
first Big Four Foreign Ministers' meeting in five years; the last one was the
Council of Foreign Ministers meeting of May 23 - June 10, 1949 in Paris.
Three items were agreed upon as the agenda for the Berlin Conference: a
Five Power conference on the easing of international tension, the German
question, and the Austrian question. After some haggling, agreement was
reached on the first item. The result was the calling of a conference at
Geneva, participants to be the Five Powers plus others who were interested.
With respect to Germany, British Foreign Secretary Eden presented the Western
2plan and the Russians countered with a proposal by Foreign Minister Molotov.
The principal points of disagreement continued to be the "free all-German
elections" (i.e., whose definition of "free" would be used) and whether Germany
was to be neutral in the future.
With negotiations stalemated, on February 10 the U.S.S.R. presented a new
proposal on Germany and a draft of a general European collective security
3treaty. The new proposal on Germany called for withdrawal of all occupying
forces within six months (except for limited protective contingents) and con-
vening of a collective security conference of appropriate European states to
^tate Bulletin
,
Vol. XXX, February 8, 1954, p. 179.
2Eden Plan: State Bulletin
,
Vol. XXX, February 8, 1954, p. 186-187.
Initial Molotov Plan: Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), p. 204-207.
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conclude a treaty to assure peace in Europe. The inference of the proposal
was that eventually a German peace treaty would be concluded, but peace would
be assured no matter what the final German status was. The European collective
security treaty draft would have replaced the EDC treaty and even perhaps the
North Atlantic treaty. Soviet efforts for recognition of the German Demo-
cratic Republic were continued by including them as a party to the treaty.
Recognition of the Chinese People's Republic was supported in the same treaty
by paragraph 9
:
9. Recognizing the special responsibility of the permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council for the mainte-
nance of peace and security, the parties shall invite the
Governments of the U.S .A. and the Chinese People's Republic to
send their representatives to the bodies set up under the
treaty, as observers . ^ (Underlining mine.)
As might have been expected the Big Three rejected the proposal. These
proposals of February 10 were to become a recurring Soviet position in the
months and years to come—reunification of Germany was linked to a general
European collective security treaty in which the U.S.S.R. was the principal
power and the U.S. was excluded in varying degrees in various proposals. As
one writer put it:
Seeing no prospect of German unification on its own terms, and
being unwilling to accept unification on Western terms, Moscow
may already have been preparing to subordinate the solution of
the German problem to the larger objective of eliminating U.S.
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On February 12 the U.S.S.R. proposed that Deputy Foreign Ministers work
on an Austrian treaty, similar to previous ones, but which would now make
Austria a neutral and require Austria "not to permit the establishment on its
territory of foreign military bases and not to permit the use of foreign
military instructors and specialists in Austria." This new Austrian treaty
draft was, as previously, linked to settlement of the Trieste problem and
occupation troop withdrawals from Austria were linked to "the conclusion of a
Q
peace treaty with Germany." Soviet obstinacy on the question of troop with-
drawals in Austria made it impossible to conclude the Austrian Treaty despite
Q
a variety of Western concessions.
After meeting for three weeks the Conference ended with no progress on
Germany or Austria and with only one tangible agreement by all sides— to call
a conference at Geneva on April 26 on the subjects of Korea and Indochina.
The U.S., U.K., France, U.S.S.R., Chinese People's Republic, Republic of Korea,
People's Democratic Republic of Korea and other participants in the hostilities
in Korea were invited to meet on the Korean question. The Big Four, Chinese
People's Republic, and other interested states were to be invited to the
Indochina discussions. The ticklish problem concerning diplomatic recognition
of those invited was handled by the following statement:
It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the
holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to
imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not
already been accorded. 10
7State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, March 1, 1954, p. 318-319.
Ibid.
9The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954
, p. 125-126.
1QDocuments on American Foreign Relations, 1954
,
p. 219. (Hereinafter
referred to as Documents, 1954.)
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The results of the Berlin Conference, rather than stimulating ratification of
the EDC treaty, served to justify postponement of consideration of the EDC
ratification until after the Geneva Conference had been completed.
On February 24 Secretary of State Dulles reporting on the Berlin Confer-
ence results stated:




Gone was the post-Stalin 'new look.'...
The Soviet position admitted of no real negotiation.
Mr. Dulles' comment on the demise of the post-Stalin "new look" was, however,
undermined in the coming months by several Soviet actions as will be seen.
The attention and alarmed concern of the world now focused on U.S. nuclear
testing when U.S. Representative W. Sterling Cole revealed in February, 1954
that the November 1, 1952 Eniwetok Atoll thermonuclear test had torn a mile
wide crater in the ocean floor and completely devastated a six mile diameter
area." Then on March 1, a new U.S. test exceeded expectations and resulted
in 300 persons being unexpectedly exposed to nuclear radiation. This was
followed by criticism of the "massive retaliation" policy both at home and
abroad.
Various Soviet leaders joined in the above criticism in their Supreme
Soviet pre-election speeches in mid-March by speaking of preventing a new war
in Europe. -) Premier Malenkov on March 12 in his "campaign" speech opposed
13





Vol. XXX, March 8, 1954, p. 344.















"the policy of cold war, for this is a policy of preparation for fresh world
carnage, which, with modern methods of warfare, means the ruin of world
civilization .' (Underlining mine.) He also worked in the subject of the
post-Stalin "new look," flavored with Stalin's "capitalist contradiction"
theory, by stressing that the Soviet Union desired peaceful competition between
East and West. There was and would continue to be contradiction and strife
between the capitalists; i.e., within the EDC, "German militarism will seize
in the West what it was unable to obtain by war."
The Soviets pursued the war theme further in a Pravda editorial on March
17 by discussing the increasing U.S. interest in Indochina, and by citing
statements of numerous U.S. leaders (Eisenhower, Dulles, Senator Stennis
—
to name a few) as evidence of the U.S. desire to expand the Indochina war. The
editorial even speculated that the U.S. at the forthcoming Geneva Conference
18
would avoid the conclusion of any peace agreement. With U.S. aircraft car-
riers in the South China Sea and high level Western diplomatic activity as
omens, the U.S.S.R. may have feared the Geneva talks would be aborted before
20they had begun. Had this happened the Communists would have lost the
1 Current Digest
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military advantage they held over the French at that time, plus the Chinese
People's Republic would have been denied the chance to attend an international
conference—a loss of prestige for the Communists in their continuing effort to
achieve recognition of the Chinese People's Republic as the rightful representa-
tive of China.
In support of the diplomatic recognition issue as it concerned the German
Democratic Republic (and perhaps to focus attention in Europe once again) , the
U.S.S.R. on March 26 purported to grant sovereignty to the German Democratic
Republic. However, "temporary stationing of Soviet troops on territory of the
German Democratic Republic" was stipulated. 21 On April 8 the Big Three High
Commissioners for Germany stated they recognized that "the Soviet Government
still retains effective control there (East Germany)" and that the "Allied
High Commission will continue to regard the Soviet Union as the responsible
power for the Soviet Zone of Germany.
On March 31 the U.S.S.R. initiated a note to the Big Three reopening the
subject of European collective security and opposing the EDC with statements
like:
...the peace-minded nations of Europe, especially West Germany's
neighbors, cannot but feel a legitimate anxiety for their
security, in view of the danger stemming from a reviving German
militarism and the incorporation of West Germany in a European
Defense Community.
Reviving German militarism and forming military groups in
Europe, far from promoting peace, means paving the way for
another war . ^3 (Underlining mine.)
The U.S.S.R. then made a concession by "seeing no obstacles in the way of
a favorable adjustment of the problem of United States participation in a
21New Times
, 1954, No. 13, March 27, 1954, p. 1.
22State Bulletin
,
Vol. XXX, April 19, 1954, p. 588.
23Ibid. , May 17, 1954, p. 758.

25
general European treaty for collective security in Europe." Then the most
surprising proposal of the Cold War was advanced as the Soviet Government
...guided by the unchanged principles of its foreign policy of
peace and desirous of relaxing the tension in international
relations, states its readiness to join with the interested
governments in examining the matter of having the Soviet Union
participate in the North Atlantic treaty.
In such a case the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would
cease to be a closed military group of states; it would be
open to other European countries and this, along with the es-
tablishment of an effective system of collective security in
Europe, would be highly important in consolidating world peace.
Not only was the U.S.S.R. proposing to join NATO, but she wanted to bring
her satellites in also. The Big Three delayed their reply until May 7, thus
allowing NATO consultations at the North Atlantic Council meeting of April
23-25.
Western pre-Geneva coordination efforts intensified as Dulles visited the
U.K. and France on April 12, 13 and 14. On April 13 a joint U.S. - U.K. state-
ment declared concern over Southeast Asian developments and proposed setting
up a collective defense organization "to assure the peace, security and freedom
25
of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific." On April 14 a joint U.S. -
French statement followed the same theme and also supported a collective
defense. (After the Geneva Conference these statements were developed into
what became the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization - SEATO.) These two state-
ments were the most the U.S. could get in support of its desire for allied
intervention, since the U.K., France and others contacted were hesitant to do
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Thailand, and the three Associated States of the French Union. See The U.S.
in World Affairs - 1954, p. 220-225 and Buttinger, p. 822.
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EDC treaty ratifications began to be completed in this post-Berlin
Conference period. The Netherlands approved the treaty on February 25, 1954;
Belgium did so soon thereafter; then Luxembourg followed on April 6. The
Federal German Republic had ratified the EDC treaty on March 31 and it appeared
that if France would ratify it, Italy would also. " To offset continuing
French apprehension over the West German's increasing strength, the U.K. and
U.S. pledges of May 27, 1952 to maintain military forces on continental Europe
to the degree they might "deem necessary and appropriate" were renewed by more
concrete statements. The U.K. on April 13 in Paris signed a U.K. Association
with the EDC Agreement with the representatives of six EDC member governments.-^
This agreement provided for close coordination between U.K. and EDC—both
politically and militarily. This was supplemented by a unilateral British
declaration "containing the invaluable assurance that Great Britain had 'no
intention of withdrawing from the Continent of Europe so long as the threat
exists to the security of Western Europe and of the European Defense Commu-
nity'." ->± The United States reaffirmed its support of the EDC and its com-
mitment to European defense on April 15 by a Presidential message to the
Prime Ministers of the EDC member nations. Like the British, the U.S. pledged
itself to a prolonged European commitment by indicating that it regarded the
NATO treaty "as of indefinite duration rather than for any definite number of
years. The United States calls attention to the fact that for it to cease to
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security interests when there is established on the Continent of Europe the
32
solid core of unity which the European Defense Community will provide."
The U.S.S.R. then introduced a new international cooperation aspect into
their foreign policy by a series of actions. They joined UNESCO on April
21. 33 On April 23 the U.S.S.R. ratified the four Geneva Red Cross conventions
of December 12, 1949. On April 27 the U.S.S.R. became a fully participating
member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) by dropping the reserva-
35tions they had made when they originally joined it. Finally on May 3 the
U.S.S.R. ratified the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide.
The Geneva Conference opened April 26 with consideration of the Korean
problem and quickly bogged down. The primary obstacle was the question of
"free elections" throughout Korea; the German parallel was painfully obvious.
On May 7 the Big Three answered the Soviet note of March 31 (the U.S.S.R.
admission into NATO proposal) to the surprise of no one:
It is unnecessary to emphasize the completely unreal
character of such a suggestion.
The Big Three also reiterated their European goals and willingness to sign an
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The Geneva talks on Indochina began on May 8 while the talks on Korea
labored on until British Foreign Secretary Eden suggested the talks be termi-
39
nated because of the futility of efforts to reach agreement. On June 15 the
non-Communist nations "reluctantly and regretfully" concluded "further con-
sideration and examination of the Korean question by the conference would serve
c i ,,40no useful purpose.
On June 12 the French cabinet under Premier Laniel resigned and the new
French government was headed by Premier Mendes-France who, on June 17 in his
investiture speech, promised an acceptable Indochina cease-fire within four
weeks or his resignation if no satisfactory solution by July 20 and "definite
proposals (regarding the EDC) . . . will be introduced in the Assembly before it
recesses (in August)." The Geneva talks virtually reduced to France and the
Communists until some headway could be made.
During this lull Prime Minister Churchill visited the United States to
discuss a variety of Anglo-American misunderstandings, including the important
issue of nuclear weapons. Also of concern were the June 10 references of
Dulles to the EDC ratification:
The time for unity (European) is fast running out.
If Western Europe is to remain divided and hence perpetually
weak, then there may have to be a basic shift in United States
policy . But it would be foolish not to recognize the gravity
of the issues which now test the North Atlantic Organization.
(Underlining mine.)
On June 28 Prime Minister Churchill and President Eisenhower issued a joint
statement of principles:
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We are agreed that the German Federal Republic should take
its place as an equal partner in the community of Western
nations, where it can make its proper contribution to the defense
of the free world.
It is our conviction that further delay in the entry into
force of the EDC and Bonn Treaties would damage the solidarity
of the Atlantic nations.
We will press forward with plans for collective defense (of
Southeast Asia) . .
.
We are both convinced if at Geneva the French Government is
confronted with demands which prevent an acceptable agreement
regarding Indochina, the international situation will be
seriously aggravated.
It is noteworthy that the statement on Germany's equal partnership did not
refer to the EDC. Perhaps prompted by the U.S. and U.K. actions, West German
Chancellor Adenauer stated on July 2 that French ratification was a necessity;
for if EDC were not approved, then the only course remaining would be to form
44
a German national army even if it led to fears of German militarism.
The Communists at this same time were pursuing their efforts to thwart
the EDC treaty. A referendum was held by the East Germans from June 27 to
June 29, 1954, choosing between fifty years of occupation and the EDC or the
withdrawal of troops and a peace treaty; 93.5% voted against the EDC. On
July 2, 1954 former Field Marshal von Paulus in East Berlin at a press con-
ference sponsored by the Committee for Unified Germany, made a statement sup-
porting the Soviet Union's "line" completely.
The U.S. kept the pressure on France also by a Mutual Security Act
amendment, approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 10,
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the EDC treaty or an acceptable alternative by December 31, 1954." Mean-
while in Geneva Premier Mendes-France was approaching his self-imposed
deadline. There is the strong possibility that the U.S.S.R. may have made a
deal with Premier Mendes-France sometime after Dien Bien Phu fell. Bernard
Fall states:
Because Russia was trying to strike a bargain with Pierre
Mendes-France (who had taken over the premiership on June 19
from Laniel and acted as his own Foreign Minister at Geneva)
over France's membership in the European Defense Community,
the Viet-Minh accepted a cease-fire on conditions a great deal
less advantageous than those it could have obtained on the
strength of its military successes. °
On July 18 formal sessions of the conference were resumed. Agreement was
reached by July 20 on a partition and cease fire, and on July 21 the armistice
49
agreements were signed (the U.S. and Vietnam did not sign). The Indochina
War was over as far as France was concerned and the U.S.S.R. could relax its
concern over the possibility of U.S. intervention. Attention now focused on
the pending French consideration of ratification of the EDC treaty.
The U.S.S.R. re-initiated the diplomatic maneuvering against the EDC with
a lengthy note on July 24 to the Big Three restating its opposition to NATO
and EDC and renewing the call for an all-European collective security system
(as it had done at Berlin on February 10) . An All-European system also would
"contribute to Lhe solution of the Austrian question." (The Austrian
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3 J
government in a note to the Big Four on July 22 had suggested establishing a
five power committee of Big Four ambassadors and Austrian representatives to
52
try to resolve their situation. ) It concluded with proposing the "calling
within the next few months of a conference of all European states who wish to
53
take part in it, and also the United States of America." The U.S.S.R. also
stated the Chinese People's Republic should send observers to the conference.
On July 30 the U.S. Senate, recognizing the difficulties of the EDC ratifica-
tion efforts, unanimously approved a resolution on German sovereignty stating:
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the
President, if he judges that future developments make this
desirable and in the national interest, should take such
steps as he deems appropriate and as are consistent with
United States constitutional processes to restore sover-
eignty to Germany and to enable her to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security.
While this resolution may not have affected the events of the next month, it
proved to be very valuable after August 30. On August 4 the Soviets made a
supplementary statement that reduced the diplomatic level of involvement by
proposing a Big Four conference of Foreign Ministers "to be held approximately
in August-September of this year." This conference was to consider "in a
preliminary way the question of calling of such a conference (all-European) and
of measures contributing to its success." Finally "it would be expedient in
the opinion of the Soviet Government to make new efforts in order to reach
agreement in the first place with regard to several separate questions having
to do with the German problem which could be resolved at the present time in
52
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a manner acceptable to the interested sides."
These two Soviet initiatives caused Prime Minister Churchill to terminate
his correspondence with Foreign Minister Molotov since Churchill felt the
Soviet notes superseded his efforts to have high level talks with at least the
U.K. and U.S.S.R. participating. This correspondence had been started by
Churchill right after the U.S. -U.K. talks in June.
The U.S. accepted the Austrian proposal (of July 22) on August 7 stating
its willingness to participate in a five power committee, but that "negotiation
of such a treaty (Austrian State treaty) would not properly be within the
co
competence of this committee." The U.S.S.R. countered this by accepting the
proposal for a meeting, but asserted the committee should "consider the ques-
tions relating to the draft State Treaty which are not yet settled, and other
59
questions connected with the conclusion of this treaty." Thus the treaty was
to be deferred and new issues introduced.
Efforts to block German rearmament and disorganize Western solidarity were
also being made by the Soviet satellites. Two important defections to East
Germany had occurred and received wide publicity. First, Dr. Otto John—direc-
tor of the federal Office for Protection of the Constitution (West German state
security organization)—made two radio broadcasts and had one press conference
in East Germany shortly before the French EDC vote in August, 1954, and claimed
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Union deputy Schmidt-Wittmack supported Dr. John's statements and claimed there
were secret U.S. -West German negotiations for twenty-four, instead of twelve,
divisions of West German's Army. In another divisive maneuver, on August 25
Poland proposed in a note to France that a treaty of alliance and mutual as-
sistance with protection against German militarism be concluded between them.
Not wanting to be on an equal footing with a Soviet satellite, France showed no
62
xnterest.
Premier Mendes-France's special panel had been unable to agree on modifi-
cations for the EDC treaty, so on August 11 he produced his own proposals.
They were not favorably received in France (four cabinet ministers resigned)
nor abroad. On August 19 Mendes-France met with other EDC foreign ministers
to consider his proposals which would have required renegotiating the treaty.
By August 22 the conference broke up in complete disagreement.
On August 28 debate opened on the treaty with all six committees reporting
it unfavorably and Mendes-France showing his lack of support for the treaty by
not making the ratification a question of confidence. On August 30, 1954, the
French National Assembly voted 319 to 264 to move on to other business with the
64
government deputies not taking part in the vote. The EDC was dead. German
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This complex period began with hope for "new Soviet attitudes" at the
Berlin Conference, saw the Geneva Conference reach an armistice agreement and
ended with the French refusal to ratify the EDC. The Western Alliance was be-
ing sorely tested and the Soviet Union's "peace-loving" policies appeared to




IV. ONWARD TO GERMAN REARMAMENT
This period begins with the Western efforts, following the EDC treaty's
defeat, to arrive at a new arrangement to restore sovereignty to the Federal
Republic of Germany and to provide for its rearming; and ends with the newly
sovereign Federal Republic of Germany acceding to the North Atlantic Treaty
(May 6, 1955).
Initially, to the Soviet Union's delight, the West seemed dazed and dis-
organized, but the Soviet jubilation was destined to be short-lived. The U.S.
had a commitment to the eight nation conference on Southeast Asian collective
security on September 6 and chose to honor that commitment before making further
efforts for European security. Dulles did state on August 31 before departing
for the Philippines:
The United States stands ready to support the many in
Western Europe who despite their valiant efforts are left
in grave anxiety.
There is much on which to build, and those foundations
should not be shaken by any abrupt or any ill-considered
action of our own.
2
(The U.S. was later to point out it was stressing "partnership," not
"leadership" in this new effort on Germany; i.e., it would let the Europeans
3
take the initiative. )
On September 8 the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) was
signed and with it was signed a protocol including Cambodia, Laos and the free
Countries involved were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, The
Philippines, Thailand, the U.K., and the U.S.A. For the announcement see State
Bulletin
,
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2
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territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam in the areas protected
by SEATO.
4
With the EDC vote a matter of historical record, on September 10 the Big
Three replied to the U.S.S.R.'s note of July 24 and statement of August 4 by
pointing out the futility of past negotiations on the still unsettled European
questions. The Big Three set forth prerequisite conditions for the U.S.S.R.
before any future meetings of foreign ministers could be considered:
(A) signing the Austrian State treaty with the Soviet
text of the previously unagreed articles, an offer made at
the Berlin Conference by the United States, United Kingdom,
France, and Austria which the United States Government
(France and the U.K. sent identical notes) now renews;
(B) agreeing to free elections on the basis proposed by
the United States Government at Berlin as the essential first
step towards German reunification in freedom.
5
Chancellor Adenauer on September 10 called for German participation in
NATO as a full member. The next day Foreign Secretary Eden began a tour of
European capitals to explore prospects for an alternative to the EDC, perhaps
an extension of the 1948 Brussels treaty. This plan as proposed by Mr. Eden
was accepted by the Federal German Republic, Italy and the Benelux nations;
however, Premier Mendes-France continued his opposition to Germany's membership
in NATO. 8
Armed with the Senate resolution of July 30, Mr. Dulles visited Bonn and
London on September 16 and 17 and omitted the rest of Europe, including Paris,
4
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ostensibly because of the beginning of the United Nations General Assembly ses-
9
sion the next week.
The trips of Mr. Eden and Mr. Dulles led to a conference of the six former
EDC treaty nations, U.K., U.S. and Canada in London on September 28. The con-
ference opened with significant statements by the U.S. and the U.K. The U.S.
virtually promised renewal of President Eisenhower's pledge to maintain forces
in Europe if a suitable substitute for the EDC were developed. The U.K. made
an unprecedented promise:
The United Kingdom will continue to maintain on the
mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective
strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now as-
signed to SACEUR— four divisions and the tactical Air
Force—or whatever SACEUR regards as equivalent fighting
capacity.
The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw those
forces against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels
Treaty Powers, who should take their decision in the knowl-
edge of SACEUR' s views. This undertaking would be subject
to the understanding that an acute overseas emergency
might oblige Her Majesty's Government to omit this procedure.
If maintenance of the United Kingdom forces on the mainland
of Europe throws at any time too heavy a strain on the ex-
ternal finances of the United Kingdom, then we would invite
the North Atlantic Council to review the financial condi-
tions on which the formations are maintained.
H
The U.K. statement, like the U.S. one, was based on the condition that the con-
ference be successful in its deliberations.
The conference was completed on October 3 and produced a collection of
documents which provided for West German sovereignty and rearmament and NATO
12
membership. A pair of far-reaching unilateral declarations by the Federal
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Republic of Germany were included in the documents. One declaration stated:
. . .the German Federal Republic undertakes never to
have recourse to force to achieve reunification of Germany
or the modification of the present boundaries of the Ger-
man Federal Republic, and to resolve by peaceful means any
disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and
other States. 13
In the other declaration the Federal Republic undertook not to manufacture an
assortment of weapons; included in the prohibited list were atomic, biological
and chemical weapons.
To quiet fears over Berlin's status the Big Three declared they would main-
tain armed forces in Berlin to guarantee its peace and safety until a peace
treaty relieved them of the responsibility.
With these preliminary agreements completed, the conference adjourned and
the nations set about working out the detailed agreements with the intention of
completing the agreements in Paris concurrent with the North Atlantic Council
meeting scheduled for October 22.
On October 5 a settlement of the Trieste problem was announced. This
eliminated one of the problem areas the U.S.S.R. had often linked with Austrian
and German settlements. A week later the U.S.S.R. informed the President of
the United Nations Security Council that the Soviet Government "takes cognizance
of the agreement" and the agreement "will promote the establishment of normal
relations between them (Italy and Yugoslavia) , and thus contribute toward a





















attitude on the part of the U.S.S.R. was in response to the Balkan Alliance,
a defensive military alliance formed by Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey on
1 8
August 9 , and the accompanying possibility that Yugoslavia might strengthen
its Western ties further; or perhaps it was merely another move toward restora-
tion of good relations with the Yugoslavs.
The U.S.S.R. on October 6 began its campaign against the London agreements.
The occasion was the fifth anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic
19
Republic. U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Molotov gave the principal speech. In it
he called for immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces to create more
favorable conditions for East and West German rapprochement and thus, reunifi-
cation. He implied that the U.S.S.R. was more favorably inclined to "free all-
German elections" than it had been in the past. On October 17 the East Germans
held "elections" (the first since 1950). Though the elections were as fraudu-
lent as ever, the East Germans declared they were "the most democratic in Ger-
., «_ „20man history.
On October 12 the Austrian government replied to the U.S.S.R.'s August 12
invitation to Ambassador level discussions with the understanding that occupa-
21
tion troops would have to be withdrawn if a treaty were concluded.
By mid-October the French and West German parliaments had indicated their
22
approval of the general issues of the London agreements. This assured the
other Western powers that meaningful agreements could be signed in Paris. As
1 o
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the North Atlantic Council meeting approached, only one problem area remained
—
the Saar. On October 19 Dr. Adenauer and Mr. Mendes-France began negotiations
within the framework of the "van Naters plan" that had last been discussed by
23
the Laniel cabinet and Dr. Adenauer in May 1954. On October 23 at 3:00 a.m.
agreement was reached on the basis of the "van Naters plan" with the newly
expanded Western European Union acting for the Saar in foreign and defense
matters. Economic arrangements were to be similar for Germany and France,
24
though the French had the more advantageous position. The statute was to be
submitted to a popular referendum in the Saar and once approved it could not
be questioned until the German peace treaty was concluded. No provision was
25
made for the statute not being approved.
The other necessary agreements—restoration of German sovereignty by the
Big Three; the expansion of the Brussels treaty into the Western European Union
(to include Germany and Italy) ; the Convention of Foreign Forces in Germany
(German consent for the continued presence of allied forces in Germany) ; and an
invitation to West Germany to accede to NATO (to be issued upon ratification
of the Brussels treaty protocols and the Convention of Foreign Forces in Ger-
many)—were agreed on by October 22. On October 23 all agreements, henceforth
known as the Paris Agreements, were signed. Once again the issue of German re-
armament was to be subjected to the ratification process; this time there were
fifteen countries involved instead of six.
2 3
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On the day the Paris agreements were signed, the U.S.S.R. delivered a
very lengthy note to the Big Three. Initially belaboring the West for its
opposition to the draft for a collective security organization in Europe,
the U.S.S.R. then seemed to take a less hostile attitude on the issue of free
all-German elections:
The Soviet Government expresses its readiness again
to consider, taking into account the new circumstances
noted above, the proposals for holding all-German elec-
tions which were introduced at the Berlin Conference by
England and were supported by the United States and
France.
But this was qualified by the next statement:
At the same time the Soviet Government assumes that
the pertinent proposals of the Soviet Union will also
be taken into consideration.
Attacking the Paris agreements ("These decisions, which free the hands
of German militarists, are dictated by aggressive circles of the power which
aim at a world domination on the basis of carrying out the notorious 'policy
of strength'."), the U.S.S.R. declared:
Either the four powers who bear special responsibility
for the solution of the German problem will do everything
in order to begin examination of and decide the most ur-
gent question— the question of the reestablishment of the
unity of Germany in which the German people are so inter-
ested and along with them all the peace-loving peoples of
Europe; or if matters reach the point of reestablishment
of German militarism and the involvement of West Germany
in aggressive military groupings (read NATO) , then the
German nation for a long time will remain torn in two
,
and from a remilitarized West Germany there will be crea-




The U.S.S.R. then reiterated its proposal for the immediate withdrawal
of occupation troops and stated the necessity for both of the German states











armament of all types of German police in East and West Germany." Then a Big
Four Foreign Ministers Conference was proposed for November on the subjects of
free all-German elections and reunification, withdrawal of occupation troops,
and convocation of an all-European conference on collective security. Hope for
Austria was held out by the U.S.S.R. query "if the Governments of the three powers
agree that their Ambassadors could take part in the conference in Vienna for the
examination of questions connected with the conclusion of a state treaty with
30
Austria." This was not a proposal to finalize the treaty. Thus, the U.S.S.R.
appeared to be offering something to everyone in their effort to delay ratifi-
cation and confuse the issues.
From October 27 to October 29 Chancellor Adenauer visited the United
States for talks with the President and to sign a Treaty of Friendship, Com-
31
merce, and Navigation with the U.S. In his departure address Chancellor
Adenauer stated "his view that the primary Soviet objective was 'to dis-
32interest the United States in European questions'."
With Western parliaments beginning debates on the Paris agreements,
the U.S.S.R. shifted its tactics away from merely exchanging notes with the
Big Three and on November 23 unilaterally invited twenty-three European nations
and the United States to a conference on European collective security. Efforts
on behalf of the Chinese Communists continued:
Recognizing the special responsibility for mainten-
ance of international peace and security borne by states
which are permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council, the Soviet Government considers it desirable for
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The conference was to be held on November 29 at either Moscow or Paris. The
U.S.S.R. stated it sent the note to those with whom it had diplomatic rela-
tions and suggested any of the Big Three could invite other European states
(i.e., the Federal Republic of Germany).
On November 19 the Big Three submitted a report to the United Nations
General Assembly on the progress of Austrian treaty efforts. The efforts,
since the December, 1952 General Assembly resolution appealing to the Big
Four to complete the Austrian treaty, were enumerated and the unfinished
treaty was blamed on the U.S.S.R.: "Further progress depends upon the atti-
tudes of the Soviet Government."
Premier Mendes-France concluded a three-day visit to the United States
on November 20 with a joint U.S. -French communique covering several issues.
Of particular interest was the second paragraph which brushed aside the recent
Soviet notes, but suggested that post-ratification negotiations were possible:
With regard to Europe, it was agreed that the early
ratification of the Paris agreements by all countries
concerned will strengthen the unity of the Western
world. It should open the way for consideration of
means of improving international relations
,
in accord-
ance with the spirit and the goals of the Charter of
the United Nations , both Governments being ready to
enter
, not into improvised debates intended mainly for
propaganda, but into adequately prepared negotiations
,
carried on in good faith . -^ (Underlining mine.)
The same day in a Pravda interview Foreign Minister Molotov offered to
postpone the collective security meeting if the ratification of the Paris
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Premier Mendes-France two days later in addressing the United Nations
General Assembly amplified on the U.S. -French joint communique. He first
discussed the recent Soviet conference proposals:
I shall be very frank in saying, first that those pro-
posals, in their present form, are neither realistic or
reasonable. Without proper preparation—which is essential
to such a venture— it is hard to find in such negotiations
any concrete basis for success. A request made on 13 Novem-
ber to twenty-five countries, asking those countries to
meet two weeks later to discuss a vague, or rather non-
existent, agenda, cannot, I submit without hesitation to
the Soviet Union representatives, be taken seriously.
Speaking of Molotov's proposed deferral, he said:
That request shows that for the Soviet Union it is
less a question of discussing the topics which divide us
or the organization of peace in Europe than of hindering
the implementation of decisions which the U.S.S.R. has
constantly opposed.
. . .there can be no objective and effective discus-
sion in a four-power conference until the countries of
West Europe which are directly concerned have ratified
the Paris treaty. '
Mr. Mendes-France then proposed a four power conference after the Paris
agreements ratification had been completed, perhaps as early as May in Paris,
With regard to the Austrian question, he stated that settlement of that is-
sue was up to the U.S.S.R. and could "considerably improve the international
atmosphere and create favorable conditions for the success of this (proposed
38
Big Four) conference."
Perhaps he anticipated the outcome of the November 29 Moscow conference
already because he suggested a plan that he felt could lead to future Euro-
pean collective security arrangements:
37







At the risk of surprising our colleagues who represent
those countries here, I affirm that, for my part, I would be
quite happy to see the creation of an East Europe defense
organization, so long as it adopts the modalities provided
for by the West for the publication, limitation, and control
of armaments.
If this were done, then:
Later exchanges of information and mutual assurances
could take place between the two systems.
and
A flexible regional plan would then gradually be set up,
with the field of application of the limitations reductions,
O Q
and control increasing progressively. y
On November 29 the opening day of the Moscow Conference, the Big Three
replied to the Soviet post-Paris agreements' proposals in a note which stated
that all NATO members plus the Federal Republic of Germany had been consulted
and since no new proposals had been made by the U.S.S.R. it was obvious that:
The Soviet note of November 13 is openly and explicitly
aimed at delaying or preventing the ratification of the Paris
agreements.^
Once again the Big Three set forth specific conditions that the U.S.S.R.
must fulfill prior to any future conference being called:
(1) Agreement to sign the Austrian State Treaty;
(2) Clarification by the Soviet Government of its position
on the question of free elections in Germany which are the
essential first steps to German reunification;
(3) Exchanges through diplomatic channels on any other
European questions of common interest which might suitably be
examined at a later four power meeting, in particular, ques-
tions relating to European security;
(4) A meeting of the four-power Ministers as soon as it
should appear that there is a real prospect of finding solu-
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(5) Should it thereafter appear useful, a wider con-
ference of European and other interested powers to consider
the remaining aspects of European security.
^
If the U.S.S.R. 's "cooperation" and lack of menacing action had lulled the
West into a sense of security that resulted in the failure of the EDC, it now
appeared that the U.S.S.R. 's actions could only hasten the ratification of the
Paris agreements unless the Soviets were to make some truly significant
concession.
Nonetheless the Moscow Conference was held with the U.S.S.R. and its
seven satellites attending. Yugoslavia even declined the invitation and
Finland made its acceptance conditional on the attendance of all others
42invited. The Chinese Communists were present as observers and all nine
countries joined in the Declaration of Eight Eastern European Governments
issued December 2, 1954. The declaration called for collective security based
on all the European states, then it warned the West that "ratification of
these (Paris) agreements would be an act aimed against the preservation of
43peace and making for another war in Europe."
The Parties to this Conference declare they have decided,
should the Paris agreements be ratified, to adopt joint
measures in the sphere of organization of their armed forces
and their command, as well as other measures required for
strengthening their defensive power, protecting the peaceful
labours of their peoples, guaranteeing the inviolability of
their frontiers and territories, and providing defence
against possible aggression.
^
One week later a U.S.S.R. note to the Big Three warned that the ratifica-















Germany into NATO "would compel the Soviet Union and other peace-loving
countries" to take without delay "every necessary step to oppose the growing
,,45
armed forces of the aggressive States. This was the last Soviet note
delivered in identical form to the Big Three (i.e., between the principal
spokesmen for East and West blocs) until April when the ratification was
virtually complete. During the December to April period, Soviet notes were
directed at individual nations or groupings such as the Western European Union.
Perhaps the U.S.S.R. felt the potential for division and weakening of the
Western alliance was greater if each individual nation were contacted
separately.
Keeping up the diplomatic barrage, the Soviets sent a note to France on
December 16 declaring the Paris agreements were not in keeping with the
"Franco-Soviet treaty of alliance and mutual assistance concluded on December
46
1, 1944." If the Paris agreements were ratified, that action would cancel
and annul the Franco-Soviet treaty, thus full responsibility for that annul-
ment rested with the French government. The next day the U.S.S.R. sent
individual notes to each of the thirteen countries (besides the Big Three) that
did not attend the Moscow Conference. Each individual note expressed regret
that the country did not attend the Conference to work for collective security,
then reviewed the Soviet objections to the Paris agreements and rearming of
47
West Germany. On December 20 the British received a note, similar to the
U.S.S.R. note to France, threatening the British with annulment of the "Anglo-
,,48
Soviet treaty of alliance and mutual assistance of May 26, 1942." The
5
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British were also accused of pressuring other European countries to speed up
the ratification. The next day the British politely stated that Soviets'
49
threatened annulment was in poor taste and not justified.
The North Atlantic Council met on December 17 and 18 and approved the
Military Committee report which called for nuclear weapons to be phased into
the NATO armed forces and planning. This would be a new use of nuclear
weapons and offered NATO a method for stopping Soviet land forces (though
the damage to Europe proper would probably be unacceptable as the NATO powers
were to discover during exercise "Carte Blanche" in June 1955. ) These
nuclear weapons were to help offset the weakness which would have resulted
during the two to five year period it would take to build up the German army.
Otherwise greater expenditures by the other NATO members would have been
necessary. ,
Meanwhile ratification of the Paris agreements was proceeding smoothly in
the various countries concerned. A real item of encouragement was the Italian
52
Chamber approval of the agreements on December 23. However the French vote
on December 24 rejected the protocol to the Brussels treaty but approved the
other agreements. Mr. Mendes-France then made the matter a vote of confidence.
On December 30, 1954 the final vote was taken and the National Assembly passed
53
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The Soviet Government on January 13 sent a note to each member of the
Western European Union (except West Germany) alleging that the Paris agreements
violated the Geneva convention of 1925 concerning chemical and biological war-
54
fare. Two days later the Soviets issued a statement wishing for normaliza-
tion of relations with West Germany and suggesting probability of free elec-
tions before the end of 1955—if the Paris agreements were not ratified.
However if ratification were to occur, then the U.S.S.R. would have to have
closer relations with the German Democratic Republic and a European (read
Communist) security organization would be necessary. In keeping with its
call for normalization of relations, the U.S.S.R. ended its state of war with
Germany on January 25, 1955. (The Big Three had terminated the state of war
with Germany in 1951. ) The next day the U.K. and France rejected the claims
of the U.S.S.R. 's December notes threatening annulment of Anglo-Soviet and
CO
French-Soviet treaties. On February 3 the Western European Union nations in
rejecting the Soviet note of January 13 pointed out the Soviets had misrepre-
sented the Paris agreements with respect to the Geneva contention on bacterio-
logical and chemical warfare. The Paris agreements were not in violation of
59
the Geneva convention. On February 1, 1955 East Germany published a state-
ment by a group of eighty-seven former Nazi generals and officers (asserted to
60
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The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. met from February 3 to February 9,
1955. It proved to be a most interesting session. On February 4 a twelve
6 ?
percent increase in the Soviet military budget was announced and the next
day Izvestia stated that the free all-German elections referred to in the
Soviet statement of January 15 meant:
the Soviet Government agrees to all-German elections under
international control since it wishes to assist the most rapid
unification of Germany on a peaceful and democratic basis. 63
On February 8 Premier Malenkov requested to be relieved from his post as
Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Defense Minister Nikolai Bulganin was
"elected" in his place. That same day Foreign Minister Molotov's speech
threatened that ratification of the Paris agreements:
. . .would become the principal obstacle in the way of a solution
to the German problem.
However, rejection of the Paris agreements and the achieve-
ment of a corresponding agreement between the four powers -
France, Britain, United States and U.S.S.R. - would make it
possible to hold, even this year, all-German elections for the
purpose of restoring the unity of Germany on a peace-loving




To us it is clear that in the case of ratification of the
Paris agreements Western Germany will follow the road of
restoring militarism and in fact will find itself in the hands
of the German revenge seekers."-5
This was followed by renewed threats to establish another European
military pact and to cancel the alliance and mutual alliance treaties with
France and Britain. Molotov asserted that the U.S.S.R. was ahead of the U.S.A.
in hydrogen bomb production and equal to the U.S.A. in any balance of power
61
New Times
, 1955, No. 7, February 12, 1955, p. 1.
62
Ibid ., February 4, 1955, p. 1.
63
Ibid. , February 6, 1955, p. 26.
64
New York Times







calculations. Despite the bristling tone of this speech, Molotov did imply
that an Austrian peace treaty might finally be possible when he did not link
the German and Austrian questions together. This was a major shift of the
Soviet position in the Cold War.
Premier Bulganin in his February 9 speech laid the blame for world
tension on the West declaring they based their policy, not on friendship and
cooperation, but on "positions of strength" while the Soviet Union stood for
"negotiations and relations which lead to a reduction of international
,,66
tension.
On February 28 the Soviets once again threatened the British with annul-
ment of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942. The next day Dr. Pontecorvo, a
British atomic scientist, disclosed his presence in Russia and issued a plea
against the use of nuclear weapons and against the threat of revival of the
68
German militarism.
The Western determination to get the Paris agreements ratified, however,
was just as great as the Soviet opposition. President Eisenhower on March 10
sent a message to the Prime Ministers of the seven Western European Union
signatories. This was the statement that Mr. Dulles had promised in Paris in
October and a restatement of the commitment made to the European Defense Com-
munity. The President affirmed that ratification of the Paris agreements vould
mean the U.S. would "continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such
units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its















area while a threat to that area exists." In closing he reaffirmed that the
U.S. considered the NATO treaty to be of indefinite duration, not just twenty
years. This assurance was helpful in the upcoming French debate in the Council
of the Republic. Perhaps it was deemed particularly necessary because once
again the French cabinet had changed; Mr. Mendes-France had been replaced by
Mr. Faure on February 23.
On March 11 the Soviets issued a new statement on Austrian negotiations.
They indicated that they were willing to remove occupation troops if it could
be assured that there was no possibility of Anschluss between Germany and
Austria. This statement further separated the German and Austrian treaties
which until February 8, 1955 had been linked to the German issue. On March 14
the Austrians again stated the need for a conference of the Big Four and
72
Austria. Five days later the U.S.S.R. again threatened France with annulment
73
of the French-Soviet treaty of 1944. In what turned out to be the last
Soviet effort to stop the Paris agreements' ratification, the Soviet Foreign
Ministry announced on March 21 that there was unanimous agreement between the
signers of the Moscow Declaration of December 2, 1954 (including the Chinese
People's Republic) on the principles of a mutual defense treaty and an organi-























Despite these threats as March ended the two parliamentary ratifications
that were expected to be the most difficult to obtain were completed: West
Germany on March 18 and France on March 27. The final ratification signa-
tures for both countries came within two weeks. With the French parliament's
action finally completed, other nations completed their ratifications in April.
Austrian treaty activity picked up in April as the Big Three made a
declaration on April 5 suggesting Ambassadorial talks on the treaty could be
held if the U.S.S.R. put forth new proposals at the upcoming meeting in
Moscow. The Austrian government then sent a delegation to Moscow for
negotiations from April 11 to April 15. On April 15 the communique on Austrian-
Soviet Union talks indicated that the rough spots in the treaty had been
resolved and Soviet troops would be withdrawn after the entry into force of
the Austria treaty and not later than December 31, 1955. Also Austrian
citizens now held in the U.S.S.R. would be repatriated when the treaty was
signed. On April 19 a U.S.S.R. note to the Big Three called for a conference
in Vienna of Big Four Foreign Ministers and the Austrian representatives to
"consider the question of concluding a state treaty for the restoration of an
78
independent, democratic Austria and to sign this treaty." On April 22 the
Big Three in answering the Soviet note observed that "some preparatory work
remains to be done" and therefore proposed Big Four Ambassadorial meetings
79
with the Austrians in Vienna on May 2.
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With the Paris agreement ratifications virtually assured and new hopes
for the Austrian State treaty, the Big Three announced on April 25 that their
Foreign Ministers would meet in Paris on May 8 "to discuss concrete plans for
80holding a Four Power Conference with the Soviet Government."
The only remaining problem concerning ratification was eliminated on May
4 when the West German Constitutional Court declared the French-West German
81
Saar agreement was constitutional. This legal question had been taken to
court by the Social Democrats on March 18 after they lost in their attempt to
delay ratification. They believed immediate four power talks would achieve
free elections based on their interpretation of the Soviet offers in January
82
and February. On May 5, 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany regained its




Thus ten years after the Germans had been defeated in World War II, pro-
vision had been made for at least the Western portion of Germany to rearm and
become a sovereign state. The EDC treaty signed on May 27, 1952 had taker-
twenty seven months to be defeated and the Paris agreements had taken less than
seven months to do much the same thing that the EDC treaty was to do plus some
things it was not to do (i.e., NATO membership for West Germany). European
political unity was unlikely to be achieved very soon but it was not a dead
issue. Russian efforts had ranged from defector statements to outright
threats, proposed conferences to "offers" of truly "free" all-German elections,
80
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and yet the Western alliance had refused to be tempted and had pulled together
to ratify German rearmament. Attention now turned to exploration of the
possibilities of increased detente with the Soviets.

56
V. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE TO THE FORE
The final period of this paper covers the events following the Federal
German Republic's accession to the NATO treaty to the Twentieth Party Congress
(February 14 - February 25, 1956).
After the Federal German Republic acceded to the NATO treaty on May 6, the
U.S.S.R. went through the process on May 7 of annulling the Anglo-Soviet treaty
of May 26, 1942 and the French-Soviet treaty of December 10, 1944 as they had
previously threatened to do.
Strengthened by the addition of West Germany to NATO, the West hoped that
they could negotiate meaningfully concerning the remaining European problems.
With this in mind the Big Three on May 10 sent a note to the U.S.S.R. pro-
posing a new approach to their communications - "a meeting of the heads of
Government, accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, for an exchange of views.
This would not result in "substantive answers to the major difficulties facing
the world," but hopefully a basis for future detailed efforts could be estab-
3lished. The note further proposed:
The forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers at Vienna...
might provide an opportunity for preliminary discussion of
this proposal.
^
The next day it was announced in Vienna that the Austrian treaty drafting had

















Also on May 11 the Moscow Conference participants met in Warsaw to
complete another action threatened if the Paris agreements were ratified— the
forming of the Warsaw Pact. In Premier Bulganin's opening speech, he stressed
all countries were free to join this collective security organization and then
went on to elaborate how the Soviet Union had been forced into this action by
hostile Western moves—the Soviet's familiar capitalist encirclement theme. 6
On May 14, the U.S.S.R. and its seven satellites signed the Warsaw Pact, setting
up a military - political organization much like that of NATO on paper. The
Chinese People's Republic also signed the treaty (as observers). The German
Democratic Republic was not to furnish armed forces, although they signed the
treaty. The Eastern European nations were not anxious to rearm any of
o
Germany. The rearmament of East Germany also offered the Soviets one more
bargaining point for the future.
Following the Warsaw signing, Foreign Minister Molotov flew to Vienna and
g
the next day the Big Four Foreign Ministers signed the Austrian State Treaty.
Austria could rearm, but she would be a neutral in foreign affairs. By June
27 ratification was completed and the last occupation troops left October 14.
In response to suggestions that Germany might be reunited and neutralized like
Austria, Mr. Dulles on May 24 said it was not realistic to even consider the
A Hldea.
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On May 26, 1955 a U.S.S.R. note to the Big Three accepted the invitation
to a Heads of Government conference, but cautioned that statements had been
made in the West that the Big Three were approaching "this conference 'from a
position of strength' which indicates a desire to exert inadmissable pressure
12
on the conference." The note went on to warn that "frustration of the con-
ference, which is already being prepared (positions of strength), would lead
to a further deepening of disagreements between the powers and a worsening of
13
the international situation." The U.S.S.R. then proposed Vienna for the
Heads of Government conference with a meeting of Foreign Ministers to follow.
That same day the collective leadership "team" of Bulganin and Khrushchev
14
visited Yugoslavia. Heresy had paid off for Yugoslavia. Seven years after
their expulsion from the COMINFORM, they were being wooed by Stalin's succes-
On June 6 the Big Three sent a note to the U.S.S.R. proposing the Heads
of Government conference be held in Geneva from July 18 to July 21. The
"peace-loving" Soviet Union seemed to be becoming everyone's friend; on June 7
they even proposed establishing diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic
of Germany. The transition of the Federal Republic of Germany from foe to
friend was very capably handled in the Soviet press. The primary rationaliza-
tion for the transition was that friendship between the two countries was
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Three proposal of July 18 as the beginning date and of Geneva as the place
for the Heads of Government conference. On June 25 another in the growing
list of conciliatory actions was taken by the U.S.S.R. as it expressed, in a
memorandum to the United States, willingness to pay fifty percent of the damages
1 o
to a U.S. plane that Soviet fighters shot down on June 23. The usual Soviet
practice had been to claim that the U.S. had violated the air space over its
territory and refuse to pay any damages. On June 31 the U.S.S.R. also decided
to join the Inter-Parliamentary Union. This was fulfilling the Supreme Soviet
declaration of February 9 calling for direct contacts between the Supreme
19Soviet and Parliaments of other countries.
That same day the Federal Republic of Germany accepted the U.S.S.R. pro-
posals for talks, but suggested the subjects ought to be more clearly defined
before any high level talks were held. It was proposed that the F.D.R. and
20
U.S.S.R. Embassies in Paris discuss the subjects of a future agenda. Further
efforts to increase their "cooperation" image occurred on July 8 at a UNESCO
meeting. The U.S.S.R. announced it would rejoin the World Health Organization
and would make its first contribution to the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF). 21
On July 18, 1955 the meeting Winston Churchill had called for in May,
1953 and corresponded about in summer 1954 finally occurred; the Big Four Heads
of Government met at Geneva. This "summit" conference was not called with




















Geneva"—an intangible, but apparently desirable accomplishment, at least to
22
the typewriters of the world s press. A great number of subjects were
brought forth and discussed to varying degrees. A startling proposal came
from the U.S.A. when President Eisenhower on July 21 suggested an "open skies"
plan to permit aerial inspection of the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. (each by the other)
in the interests of developing mutual confidence by permitting each side to
23better assess the military capabilities of the other. The U.S.S.R. dis-
missed the proposal as being impractical. The U.S.S.R. suggested two differ-
ent versions of European collective security treaties as prerequisites for
German reunification, renewed the call for the Chinese People's Republic to
take the Chinese seat in the United Nations Security Council, made a sweeping
proposal for reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons, and
refused to discuss either their East European satellites or international
24
Communism. The U.S.S.R. also invited the Big Three to do as the Soviets
planned to do and reduce the strength of their armed forces by demobilizing
25
the military contingents they were withdrawing from Austria. This was
asserted to be in the interests of relaxing international tensions.
The final act of the conference on July 23 was to issue a directive to
the Big Four Foreign Ministers. This directive provided for general subjects
to be considered under the following headings—European Security and Germany,
Disarmament, and Developments of Contacts between East and West. The Foreign
Ministers were to meet in Geneva in October.
22
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On the way back from Geneva the "team" of Bulganin and Khrushchev stopped
in East Germany from July 24 to July 26, and in departing emphasized the need
for East and West German rapprochement as the key to future reunification
27
hopes.
On August 3 the Soviets in a note to the Federal Republic of Germany sug-
28gested talks in late August - early September in Moscow. On August 12 the
German reply suggested September 9 and agreed to an agenda of talks on diplo-
matic, trade, and cultural relations. In addition they proposed adding to the
agenda the question of German unity and the release of those Germans who were
29
still held in the U.S.S.R. or "in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence."
A week later the U.S.S.R. agreed to talks in Moscow on September 9. No men-
tion of German prisoners of war was made by the Soviets, but they agreed to an
30
exchange of views on international questions of interest to both parties.
On August 12 the U.S.S.R., as it had proposed at Geneva, announced a
31
reduction of 640,000 troops to be completed by December 15, 1955. This was
held to be possible due to a relaxation in international tensions— the spirit
of Geneva! The demobilized troops were to be employed in industry and col-
lectivized agriculture the announcement stated. This was soon followed by
32
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At Moscow on September 9 the U.S.S.R. and Federal German Republic
representatives began talks. Initial Soviet statements concerned German unity
and the problems that the current West German military alignments posed.
Chancellor Adenauer responded by observing that "there can be no real security
33in Europe without restoration of German unity." He emphasized that he could
make no bilateral deals, the subject of German unity was for the discussion of
the Big Four Foreign Ministers. He then brought up the question of German
prisoners of war still in the Soviet Union and their possible return. Finally
he agreed that diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations would be of ad-
vantage to the two countries. Negotiations became more strained in the days
that followed as Premier Bulganin spoke of the fact that there were no German
prisoners of war "only 9,626 convicted war criminals from the former Hitlerite
Army." If the question of these men were to be discussed, the Soviets felt
the German Democratic Republic should be equally represented. Dr. Adenauer
countered with comments about terrible things the Soviet Army had done in its
advance into Germany. Mr. Khrushchev interrupted to protest this allegation,
then on the subject of reunification, "he said, 'You (Dr. Adenauer) must
understand our position. We honestly and repeatedly warned you that the Paris
Agreements and the entry of the German Federal Republic into NATO would block
34
a solution of problems in the near future'."
Finally on September 13 a communique was issued stating that diplomatic
relations would be established and trade negotiations would be held in the
future. Premier Bulganin and Chancellor Adenauer exchanged letters repeating
these statements and agreeing to establish diplomatic relations upon ratifica-








Premier Bulganin in a final statement claimed there were 100,000 Soviet
35
citizens that were being forced to remain on West German territory. Dr.
Adenauer at a press conference before leaving Moscow announced that he had
sent a second letter to Premier Bulganin stressing that establishment of dip-
lomatic relations in no way changed the Federal Government's opinion that
final demarkation of the German borders must await the conclusion of a German
peace treaty and the Federal Government considered itself the only legitimate
government of all Germany (i.e., only freely elected). Further he stated that
he had been given assurances that repatriations of the 9,626 Germans held in
the U.S.S.R. would begin immediately. Also at that press conference he
declared no secret agreements had been concluded between the two sides.
On September 15 the Soviet Government announced it regarded the frontiers
of Germany as final, the question having been solved by the Potsdam agreement,
and the German Federal Republic was carrying out its jurisdiction on the
territory under its sovereignty. This supported the July 6 declaration of
Poland and the German Democratic Republic that the Oder-Neisse boundaries were
37
"definite and irrevocably fixed."
On September 17 the German Democratic Republic and U.S.S.R. commenced
negotiations in Moscow and on September 20 they signed a treaty. Parts of
some of the articles are of particular interest:
Article 1. The contracting Parties solemnly reaffirm that
the relations between them are based on full equality, mutual
respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in
each other's internal affairs.
The German Democratic Republic is accordingly free to decide
questions of home and foreign policy, including its relations
with the German Federal Republic and the development of rela-















Article 4. The Soviet forces now stationed on the
territory of the German Democratic Republic in accordance
with existing international agreements shall temporarily
remain in the German Democratic Republic with the consent
of its Government and on conditions to be defined by supple-
mentary agreement between the Government of the Soviet Union
and the Government of the German Democratic Republic.
The Soviet forces temporarily stationed on the territory
of the German Democratic Republic shall not interfere in the
internal affairs or th e soci al and political life of the
German Democratic Republic . ^8 (Underlining mine.)
This treaty purported to restore sovereignty to East Germany, but Article 4
effectively nullified any claims of sovereignty. The U.S.S.R. also abolished
its High Commission and assigned an Ambassador to East Germany to maintain
relations with the Big Three on questions of four power concern. Release of
East Germans held in the U.S.S.R. was to receive "favorable consideration" and
the East German government would retain control of traffic (other than mili-
tary traffic) across its territory from West Germany to Berlin, and also of the
39frontiers of the German Democratic Republic. The real meaning of Article 4
was clear from this New Times statement:
On September 19 Herr Ulbricht said Soviet troops would remain
in Eastern Germany 'so long as the Western Powers are unwilling
to withdraw their troops from Western Germany and to liquidate
their military bases there'. ^0
Concurrently in Moscow there were negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and
Finland (September 17 - September 19). They concluded an agreement for
41
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On September 26 the U.S.S.R. announced a trip by top Soviet leaders
42
would be made to the uncommitted nations of India, Burma, and Afghanistan.
The next day Egypt disclosed the trade agreement it had previously announced
(July 19) with Czechoslovakia was a barter arrangement of Egyptian cotton for
43Czechoslovakian arms. On October 17 came the announcement of a Soviet offer
of a $200 million loan payable in Egyptian cotton and rice over a 30 year
44
period, at two percent interest. This represented one-third of the esti-
mated cost of the Aswan dam—a project the Egyptians were having trouble
45financing. Soviet emphasis was turning increasingly from Europe to Asia and
the Middle East.
The Soviets announced their decision to repatriate the East and West
46
German "war criminals" on September 28. This was completed by the end of
November.
The Big Four Foreign Ministers Conference (October 27 - November 16) was
of little consequence. The Big Three felt they were able to accomplish one
thing; they exposed the Soviet attitude on Germany very clearly. They offered
that if free elections were held (the Eden plan from Berlin, 1954) and a united
Germany was achieved, then a 100 to 150 mile zone would be established on
Germany's eastern frontier in which equal limitation of armaments would be in
effect. Radar networks would be established by each side in the other's
territory to serve as a precaution against surprise attack. Finally the Big
Three would undertake to defend the Eastern countries in the event of German
42
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aggression. This last item was aimed directly at the Soviets' claimed fears
47
of aggression by Germany. The Soviet Union rejected the whole plan. The
West then claimed that this meant the U.S.S.R. wanted an all-Soviet Germany
or at least as much of Germany Sovietized as possible (i.e., two Germanies)
.
While this is no doubt true, the Western condition that "the final stage (of
implementing the treaty) would become effective when a reunified Germany
decides to enter NATO and the Western European Union" seemed to prejudice
48
the situation just as much as the Soviet concept of "free elections."
The other issues of disarmament and increasing East-West contacts were unevent-
ful. As an indicator of the degree to which disagreement existed, the final
communique did not even have any of the customary reassuring diplomatic
cliches about the positive aspects of the conference. It merely stated:
The Foreign Ministers agreed to report the result of their
discussions to their respective Heads of Government and to
recommend that the future course of the discussions of the
Foreign Ministers should be settled through diplomatic
channels.^
From November 18 to December 19 the "team" of Bulganin and Khrushchev
toured India, Burma, and Afghanistan, dispensing foreign aid and occasional
invectives at the West as they traveled. In terms of foreign aid they
pledged to build a steel plant in India, set up a technical institute in
Rangoon and in exchange for Burmese rice agreed that the U.S.S.R. would con-
struct industrial plants and aid in the development of agriculture; and in
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Though these were small ventures by Western standards, they were not from
the former colonial powers and no political strings were attached and those
two features alone made them valuable and important to these countries and
others who saw what was being done. The Bandung Conference in April, 1955 had
52indicated the degree to which anything that resembled colonialism was hated.
Special provisions, like the two or three percent interest rates with no
repayments initially and overall loan periods of thirty years, while they did
not make good economics for the U.S.S.R., did make good politics.
After this highly successful tour both Bulganin and Khrushchev reported
to a session of the Supreme Soviet. Bulganin reported on the trip itself and
its meaning for those who advocated "peaceful coexistence." He also directed
53
a few pointed remarks at the colonial powers and exploiters. Then Khrushchev
berated colonizers and exploiters, especially countries like U.S.A., Britain,
and France. Then turning to the entire world situation he spoke of the Com-
munists' efforts at "peaceful coexistence" and how they had been able to
prevent a new war. With regard to the German question, he said:
That under the present circumstances there is no real
possibility of reuniting these two German states which
differ so much. ^
He closed by saying:
The friendship of peoples throughout the world is a mighty
source of strength for the peoples, barring the way to the
unleashing of a new war."
The Communist efforts to get recognition for the German Democratic Re-
public received a setback in December with the announcement in Bonn of what
52
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became known as the "Hallstein doctrine." It declared that the Federal
Republic of Germany would break off diplomatic relations with all countries
that recognized the East German regime, and would refuse to enter into diplo-
matic relations with any Communist country except the Soviet Union.
On January 18 the East Germans passed a law setting up a National People's
Army. Though no official announcement was made, it was understood that the
East German paramilitary force, the "Barracked People's Police" (estimated
100,000 strong) were to be incorporated into this National People's Army.
On January 23, 1956, Premier Bulganin sent a letter to President
58Eisenhower proposing a bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation. On
January 28 President Eisenhower answered the proposal and rejected it stating
that it was unnecessary as all items were provided for in the United Nations
59
charter that they both had signed. He then suggested Soviet deeds would be
far more effective in improving relations. This Soviet effort apparently was
aimed at reducing the sense of frustration that was present at the end of the
Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference—certainly it was in keeping with the
"peaceful coexistence" policy announced at the Twentieth Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
The Twentieth Party Congress (February 14 - February 25, 1956) brings
this period to a close. At this Congress First Secretary of the Communist
Party Central Committee Khrushchev in the keynote speech declared: "war is
not a fatalistic inevitability." He went on to say:
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Indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful
coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There
is no third way.
As far back as on the eve of the great October socialist
revolution, V. I. Lenin wrote: 'All nations will arrive at
socialism - this is inevitable - but not all will do so the
same way ' . "^ (Underlining mine.)
Clearly the attitude of the Soviet Union's leadership had changed since
Stalin's death.
This period from NATO membership for the Federal German Republic to the
Twentieth Party Congress made it increasingly clear that Germany was to stay
divided unless it was united on Soviet terms. It also saw the Soviet's two
top leaders become international figures by traveling outside the boundaries
of Soviet control to Geneva and throughout Asia—a practice Stalin never
engaged in.
The Soviet Union during this period recognized the opportunity for new
gains, at least in influence, if not control in the bloc of neutral nations
and began efforts to that end.
Leo Gruliow (ed.) Current Soviet Policies , Vol. II (New York:




The four years from Stalin's death to Khrushchev's non-inevitability of
war and peaceful coexistence statements at the Twentieth Party Congress con-
stitute one of the most important periods of the Twentieth Century, excluding
the World Wars. West opposed East in a struggle over the future of Europe,
manifested primarily in the question of Germany and its rearmament. This
struggle resulted in the finalizing of a stalemate over Europe, a stalemate
that has continued for fifteen years.
Under Stalin the Soviets had tested Western resolve in the post-war years
and in so doing had united the West in opposition to them. After Stalin's
death the West, though united against the Soviets, seemed eager for a relaxa-
tion of tensions. The Soviets, hoping for a deterioration of the West's unity,
accommodated the West by actions such as: the ending of the Korean War and
agreeing to the first Foreign Ministers' Conference in five years. The Soviets
further supported every spokesman or group that could create a divisive force
in the Western bloc; every effort was made to exploit the contradictions of the
capitalists. Throughout this period the Soviets gave particular emphasis to
the theory that West Germany once rearmed would soon dominate the other na-
2
tions in Europe, especially France and Italy. All these factors promoted
delays of French debate on the EDC treaty and finally aided in the EDC treaty's
defeat. As has been suggested, perhaps the Soviets even made a deal with the
For example: Herr Ollenhauer, the leader of the West German Social Demo-
cratic party, continually placed reunification as the first priority and often
was taking positions counter to Chancellor Adenauer's policy (Christian Demo-
cratic Union); these received thorough coverage in the Soviet press. State-
ments by anti-Hitlerite groups on Germany were likewise supported.
2
Examples of this theme are found in Current Digest , September 5, 1953,
p. 12; July 28, 1954, p. 10; October 13, 1954, p. 11; October 20, 1954, p. 13,
15; and November 17, 1954, p. 13. Also New York Times , February 7, 1955, p. 7
quotes a Pravda article of the same date.
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French concerning the EDC defeat in return for a less favorable (to the Com-
3
munists) Indochina settlement. A continuation of these tactics followed the
EDC defeat. Despite their acquiescing to the Trieste settlement, agreeing to
work seriously for an Austrian treaty, and making overtures to the "reunifica-
tion first" factions in West Germany, the Soviets were unable to prevent
ratification of the Paris agreements. The issues were too clear and the only
concession that could have prevented ratification was too costly for the
Soviets to allow— that is, "free elections." The risks of Western style free
elections throughout Germany were just too great for the Soviet Union to be
4
willing to take any chances. The West German Communist Party was inconse-
quential; memories of the June, 1953 East Berlin riots plus the continuing
problem of people "voting with their feet" made the possibility of Communist
success in Western-style free elections in Germany out of the question. Even
some form of coalition government based on population or territory (therefore
East inferior to West) was too risky for the Soviets. Thus, the NATO allies'
unified stand on the rearmament of West Germany meant that the Soviet goal of
domination or control of all of Germany was not to be achieved, nor was
Germany to be neutralized as the Soviets occasionally suggested.
Though this must be categorized as a defeat for Soviet foreign policy,
there were come considerations that offset the magnitude of the defeat. Soviet
3
See page 30 and footnote 48, Chapter III.
For the Soviet view of what "free elections" means, see the Soviet
editorial on p. 18 of Current Digest , February 24, 1954.
West German National Election results for the West German Communist
Party (Keesing's , IX, p. 13142):
1949 - 1,361,706 votes (5.7%) - 15 seats
1953 - 607,413 votes (2.2%) - seats
Adenauer stated that from September 21, 1949 to September 30, 1954,
1,149,973 people had left East Berlin and East Germany; from the death of
Stalin until September 30, 1954, 420,890 people had left East Berin and East
Germany. (Keesing's , IX, p. 13897.)
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control over East Germany meant the threat of Western influence in Eastern
Europe would remain minimal. The rearmament of West Germany provided justifi-
cation for the Warsaw Pact, with its political and military potential, thus
enabling the U.S.S.R. to continue to maintain control over its satellites.
Cries of West German revanchism are still heard today. Furthermore, Poland
realized that the Oder-Neisse border's final settlement still depended on the
U.S.S.R. That same Oder-Neisse border question offered the Communists a
future bargaining point with the West. The status of Berlin and access to it
were more future bargaining points with the West. By granting "sovereignty"
to the German Democratic Republic and letting it guard "its frontiers" and
control civilian access to Berlin, the U.S.S.R. had a convenient pinprick to
use to agitate for recognition of the German Democratic Republic and to pre-
sent a continual nuisance problem for the West. Already this had proven its
harassment value to the Soviets; in March, 1955 the truck tolls were raised
eleven-fold. The U.S.S.R. had refused responsibility for control of these
commercial charges, despite Western demands. After rearmament (in June), a
o
token reduction was made in the tolls. After the U.S .S.R. -German (West, then
East) talks in September, the U.S.S.R. had vexed the West by reiterating the
question of German borders was settled and control of non-military access to
9
Berlin was the East German government's responsibility. To emphasize this
even further, in late November a U.S. Army vehicle driven by a U.S. Army
officer and occupied by a U.S. Congressman, his wife, and another U.S.
7











Congressman had been detained in East Berlin at gunpoint for violating East
German law by having a radio telephone in the vehicle.
With the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union had provided itself a "Cordon
Sanitaire." With Finland, Sweden, and Austria neutral and Tito appearing to
be neutral or pro-Soviet, a buffer zone had been established. If in the
future West Germany or at least part of West Germany could be neutralized,
the buffer zone would be extended that much further West in Europe.
With return of Porkkala to Finland (and Port Arthur to the Chinese
People's Republic), the Soviets could claim that they had liquidated their
12
overseas bases—why did the West (read U.S.A.) refuse to? The matter of
13Western overseas bases had been a continuing target of Soviet criticism.
The Red Army's presence in Europe, of course, was a completely different
situation.
With regard to Austria, the Soviets had never been entrenched there as
they had in Germany, so the "loss" was not too great, especially since the
14
manpower the troops represented was needed in the Soviet farms and factories.
With a neutralized Austria, the Soviets forced north-south NATO land supply
lines to go via France (a military advantage for the Communists in the event
of a limited type war in Europe). Removing Soviet troops from Austria also
reduced the "surrounded" feeling Yugoslavia must have had prior to this time,
10
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thus possibly contributing to the rapprochement with Yugoslavia. As for the
satellites, the West had begrudgingly accepted that they were completely within
the Soviet sphere of influence at the Geneva Conference. Thus by 1956 the
European commitments of the U.S.S.R. and the West were more clearly defined
than at any previous time since 1945.
On the international scene the most important change of the period was the
break with the Stalinist bipolar concept of the world and the recognition of
the usefulness of the "neutrals" as potential allies against the West (in the
United Nations, etc.). The decolonization actions of the West made Communist
gains possible and likely. Western actions such as setting up SEATO made it
plain that the West was anxious to maintain and extend its influence in the
Third World, but the memories of and association with colonialism were a
millstone with which only the West had to contend. It is worthy of note that
the U.S.S.R., though it criticized SEATO in its press, did not do as Stalin
had done with NATO—bitterly attack it in a memorandum to its members that
united them even more. The April 20 - April 27, 1954 Supreme Soviet meeting
marked the start of an intensified effort to improve the Communist interna-
tional peace-loving, non-aggressive image by increased participation in the
United Nations (see page 27). The Ukrainian and Belorussian Republics and
European satellites had followed this example shortly thereafter. To counter
Ibid .
Documents on American Foreign Relations XI, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1950), p. 607-609.
Dates of joining:
UNESCO: Ukraine and Belorussia - May 12
ILO: Ukraine and Belorussia - May 13
Keesing's IX, p. 13549, 13585.

75
any claims of exploitation of the satellite countries, the U.S.S.R. had turned
18
over their interest in the various joint stock companies to the satellites.
In keeping with the Soviet's peace-loving and non-exploiting message, the
Soviets propagandized the idea that the peoples of the West were peace-loving,
but their pleas were not being heeded by the aggressive, war-mongering, ruling
classes. For example, Premier Malenkov in his August 8, 1953 speech to the
Supreme Soviet praised President Eisenhower's speech of April 16, 1953 (to
American Society of Newspaper Editors), especially Eisenhower's statement that
there was not a single disputed issue "whether it be great or small, which is
insoluble if there is the desire to respect the rights of all other countries."
Malenkov then credited Eisenhower with being a reasonable and concerned indi-
vidual, but "the actual policy of the ruling circles in the United States of
America is an irreconcilable contradiction to the statement by President
19
Eisenhower."
An added stimulus for Soviet efforts in the Third World was the success
of the Chinese Communists at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, lest the
Chinese acquire hegemony in the Third World. The Geneva conference and Asian
trip of 1955 helped the Communists' image immensely. The appeared as smiling,
ordinary men, not at all as the West had described them. Hugh Seton-Watson
writing in the 1960 's observed:
From this time (Autumn, 1955) onwards the main emphasis
of Soviet foreign policy, and the main direction of Soviet
expansion, has been towards the under-developed societies. 20
Mr. Seton-Watson overstated his point somewhat as events in Europe since 1955
1 8
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have demonstrated. The high priority of European affairs in Soviet foreign
policy has never diminished, nonetheless the Soviet actions in 1955 mark the
21
watershed of developing attention to the affairs of the Third World.
The various Soviet policy shifts throughout this period can be seen by
analyzing the May Day and the Anniversary of the October Revolution slogans
from 1952 to the end of this period. They indicate a slow, but steady build-up
against German militarism, against nuclear weapons, large armaments, the
possibility of new war, and for European collective security—culminating in
the May Day 1955 slogans. A shift then occurs. Themes of European collective
security, peaceful coexistence, and arms' reduction are presented in the 1955
October Revolution slogans and in the 1956 May Day slogans. Increasing
interest in the Third World is also indicated. (See Appendix for text of the
slogans.
)
In conclusion it may be said that after Stalin's death Soviet foreign
policy emphasized peaceful coexistence practices which finally gave way to the
peaceful coexistence pronouncements of Khrushchev supported by growing Soviet
22
nuclear strength and developing efforts in the Third World. The Communists
recognized the need to respond to changing world situations and opportunities, and
23
not tie themselves down to an inflexible, negative policy.
The West must continue to remember in its dealings with the Soviet Union
that although the Soviets say they despise "positions of strength," this is
21
Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers (New York: Avon Books, 1966),
p. 69.
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The effectiveness of this new effort is alarmingly brought out in Vernon
V. Aspaturian, "The Challenge of Soviet Foreign Policy," The Revolution in
World Politics ed. Morton A. Kaplan (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1962), p. 209-232, especially p. 231-232.
23
Shulman, p. 10 states: "in 1961 Mikoyan disclosed that the line as-
vanced at the Twentieth Congress in 1956 had evolved through two years of
thought and action beforehand."
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only because they understand its significance as an instrument of foreign
24
policy. Future challenges by the Soviets now, as then, will not be just on
the periphery of their empire, but throughout the world as the United States
and the Soviet Union engage in a continuing struggle for influence over the
future of every nation in the world.
For amplification of this, see Brewster C. Denny's "The Soviet Evalua-
tion of the Instruments and Intentions of Post-War American Foreign Policy,
1952-1956." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and






MAY DAY SLOGANS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE SOVIET UNION
(Pravda and Izvestia , April 22, p. 1.)
1. Long live May First, the day of the international solidarity of the
working people, the day of the brotherhood of the workers of all countries!
2. Fraternal greetings to all the peoples struggling against the aggres-
sors and instigators of a new war, for peace, for democracy, for socialism!
3. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democra-
cies, successfully building socialism!
4. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who have won new
successes in construction of the people's democratic China! Long live the
unbreakable friendship of the peoples of China and the Soviet Union, a
mighty force in the struggle for peace throughout the world!
5. Fraternal greetings to the valiant Korean people, heroically defend-
ing their freedom and independence in the struggle against the foreign ag-
gressors!
6. Greetings to the democratic forces of Germany, struggling against
the criminal plans to turn Western Germany into a base of imperialist ag-
gression in Europe! For a united, independent, democratic, peace-loving
German state!
7. Greetings to the glorious patriots of Yugoslavia, waging the strug-
gle for liberation against the fascist regime of the Tito-Rankovic clique,
for the independence of their motherland from the imperialists!
8. Greetings to the Japanese people, valiantly struggling against the
foreign occupation, for the rebirth and independence of their motherland,
for the maintenance of peace!
9. Long live the friendship of the peoples of Britain, the United States
of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle to avert war and ensure a
lasting peace throughout the world!
10. Working people of all countries! Peace will be maintained and made
lasting if the peoples take the cause of maintaining peace into their own
hands and stand by it to the end! Strengthen the unity of the peoples in the
struggle for peace, multiply and rally the ranks of the peace partisans!
11. Peace partisans throughout the world! Expose and thwart the cri-
minal plans of the imperialist aggressors, do not allow the warmongers to
confuse the masses with lies and drag them into a new world war!
12. Long live the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, a policy of peace
and security, equal rights and friendship among peoples!
13. Glory to the Soviet Army and Navy, standing on guard for peace and
security, equal rights and friendship among peoples!
14. Men of the Soviet armed forces! Stubbornly increase your technical
and political knowledge, improve your fighting skill! Strengthen the might
of the armed forces of the Soviet Union!
15. Long live the Soviet frontier troops, the vigilant sentinels over
the sacred boundaries of our motherland!
(The remaining slogans, 16-59, were concerned with domestic affairs and were




PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE SLOGANS FOR 35TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION
(Pravda and Izvestia
,
Oct. 30, p. 1)
1. Long live the 35th anniversary of the great October revolution!
2. Long live peace among peoples of all nations! Down with war-
mongers!
3. Fraternal greetings to all peoples fighting against the imperial-
ist aggressors and warmongers, for peace, for democracy and for socialism!
4. Fraternal greetings to the peoples of the colonial and dependent
countries, struggling against the imperialist enslavers for their freedom
and national independence!
5. Fraternal greetings to the working people of people's democracies,
who are successfully building socialism! Long live and strengthen the un-
breakable friendship and cooperation of people's democracies and the Soviet
Union!
6. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people who have achieved
new successes in the building of the powerful people's democratic Chinese
state! May the great friendship of the Chinese People's Republic and the
Soviet Union grow strong and flourish— the firm bastion of peace and se-
curity in the Far East and throughout the world!
7. Fraternal greetings to the heroic Korean people, courageously de-
fending the freedom and independence of their motherland in their struggle
against foreign marauders!
8. Greetings to the German people, who are fighting for a united, inde-
pendent, democratic and peace-loving Germany, for a speedy conclusion of a
peace treaty in the interest of the German people and for peace throughout
the world!
9. Greetings to the fraternal Communist Parties, which are leading the
peoples' struggle in capitalist, colonial and dependent countries for peace,
democracy, socialism and national independence!
10. Greetings to the patriots of Yugoslavia, fighting for the libera-
tion of their country from the fascist oppression of the Tito-Rankovic
clique and imperialist slavery!
11. Greetings to the Japanese people, courageously fighting against
foreign occupation for national regeneration, for the freedom and indepen-
dence of their motherland and for the maintenance of peace!
12. Long live the friendship of the peoples of Great Britain, the United
States of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle for the prevention
of war and the maintenance of a firm peace throughout the world!
13. Working people of all countries! Peace will be maintained and
strengthened if the peoples take the cause of maintaining peace into their
own hands and defend it to the end! Fortify the peoples' unity in their
struggle for peace! Rally and multiply the ranks of the peace partisans!
14. Peace partisans throughout the world! Expose and undermine the
criminal plans for the imperialist aggressors! Do not allow the warmongers
to confuse the masses with lies and involve them in a new world war!
15. Long live the foreign policy of the Soviet Union— the policy of




16. Glory to the Soviet Army and Navy, standing guard over peace and
the security of our motherland!
17. Soviet warriors! Persistently increase your military and political
knowledge, and perfect your combat skill! Untiringly strengthen the defen-
sive might of the socialist state!
18. Long live the Soviet frontier troops— the vigilant sentinels of the
sacred frontiers of our motherland!
(The remaining slogans, 19-67, were concerned with domestic affairs and were
not relevant to this paper.)
Current Digest




MAY DAY SLOGANS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMUNIST PARTY OF
THE SOVIET UNION
(Pravda and Izvestia , April 22, p. 1)
1. Long live May Day, the day of the international solidarity of the
working people, the day of the brotherhood of the workers of all countries!
Higher the banner of proletarian internationalism!
2. Long live peace among peoples! There is no controversial or unre-
solved issue which cannot be solved peacefully on the basis of mutual under-
standing of the countries concerned!
3. Working people of all countries! Peace will be preserved and con-
solidated if the peoples take the cause of preserving peace into their own
hands and defend it to the end! Strengthen the unity of the peoples in the
fight for peace, increase and rally the ranks of the peace partisans!
4. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democra-
cies, successfully building socialism! May the indissoluble friendship and
cooperation of the people's democracies and the Soviet Union flourish and
grow stronger!
5. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who have scored new
successes in building a mighty, people's democratic Chinese state! May the
great friendship of the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union, firm
bulwark of peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world, grow
stronger and flourish!
6. Fraternal greetings to the heroic Korean people, fighting for the
freedom and independence of their homeland!
7. Greetings to the German people, fighting for the most rapid conclu-
sion of a peace treaty, for formation of a united, independent, peace-loving,
democratic Germany!
8. Greetings to the Japanese people, courageously fighting for national
rebirth, for an independent, democratic and peace-loving Japan!
9. Fraternal greetings to the peoples of the colonial and dependent
countries, fighting against imperialist oppression, for their freedom and
national independence!
10. Long live the friendship of the peoples of Britain, the United States
of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle to avert war and ensure
lasting world peace!
11. Long live the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, an unshakeable
policy of maintaining and consolidating peace, of combating the preparation
and unleashing of a new war, a policy of international cooperation and de-
velopment of commercial relations with all countries!
12. Fraternal greetings to all peoples fighting for peace, for democracy,
for socialism, against the instigators of a new war!
13. Soviet fighting men! Stubbornly increase your military and politi-
cal knowledge and improve your fighting skill! Tirelessly strengthen the
defense capacity of the socialist state! Glory to the Soviet armed forces,
standing guard over the peace and security of our homeland!
(The remaining slogans, 14-47, were concerned with domestic affairs and were




PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE SLOGANS FOR THE 36TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION
(Pravda and Izvestia
,
Oct. 25, p. 1)
1. Long live the 36th anniversary of the great October socialist revo-
lution!
2. Long live the international solidarity of the working people in
every country!
3. Fraternal greetings to all people fighting for peace, democracy and
socialism!
4. Long live peace among peoples! There is no dispute or unsolved
question which cannot be settled by peaceful means on the basis of mutual
understanding among the countries concerned!
5. Working peoples of all countries! Strengthen the peoples' unity in
fight to ease international tension, for peace and against the aggressive
forces trying to unleash a new world war! Multiply and rally the ranks of
the peace partisans!
6. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democra-
cies, who are successfully fighting to advance national economy and raise the
people's material and cultural living standards, to construct a socialist
society! Long live and strengthen the unbreakable friendship and coopera-
tion between the people's democracies and the Soviet Union!
7. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who are fighting
successfully to industrialize their country, to develop further the economy
and culture, to strengthen thoroughly their people's democratic state! Long
live and flourish the indestructible fraternal friendship and close coopera-
tion between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic for the good
of our countries' peoples and the consolidation of peace and international
security!
8. Fraternal greetings to the heroic Korean people, who have defended
their native land from the interventionists, who are fighting for the re-
establishment of the national economy, for peace, for national unity!
9. Greetings to the democratic forces to Germany fighting against the
criminal plans for transforming Western Germany into a center for a third
world war! Long live the German Democratic Republic— a bastion in the strug-
gle for a united, independent, peace-loving and democratic Germany!
10. Greetings to the Japanese people, who are courageously fighting for
national independence, for the peaceful and democratic development of their
motherland, against the conversion of Japan into a military springboard of
the imperialists!
11. Fraternal greetings to the peoples in colonial and dependent countries
fighting against the imperialist yoke, for their freedom and national inde-
pendence!
12. Long live the friendship of the peoples of Great Britain, United
States of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle for the prevention
of war and the maintenance of a firm peace throughout the world!
13. Long live the friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and
the peoples of France and Italy!
14. Long live the foreign policy of the Soviet Union— a firm policy for
the maintenance and consolidation of peace, for the struggle against the

preparation and unleashing of a new war, policy of international cooperation
and the development of trade with all countries!
15. Soviet armed forces! Persistently increase your military and poli-
tical knowledge and perfect your combat skill! Untiringly strengthen the
defense might of the socialist state! Glory to the Soviet armed forces,
standing on guard of peace and the security of our motherland!
(The remaining slogans, 16-57, were concerned with domestic affairs and were
not relevant to this paper.)
Current Digest
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MAY DAY SLOGANS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE SOVIET UNION
(Pravda and Izvestia , April 21, p. 1)
1. Long live May Day, day of the international solidarity of the work-
ing people, day of brotherhood of the workers of all countries! Higher the
banner of proletarian internationalism!
2. Fraternal greetings to all peoples fighting for peace, for democracy,
for socialism!
3. Working people of all countries! Peace will be preserved and
strengthened if the peoples take the cause of maintaining peace into their
own hands and defend it to the end! Strengthen the unity of the peoples in
the fight for peace, increase and rally the ranks of the peace partisans!
Long live lasting peace among peoples!
4. May the solidarity of the peoples grow stronger in the struggle
against the revival of German militarism, against the establishment of ag-
gressive military groupings! For a lasting peace and collective security
for all European peoples!
5. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democra-
cies, who are building a new, socialist life, who are struggling successfully
for the further development of industry and agriculture, for a constant rise
in the welfare of the people! Long live and prosper the indissoluble friend-
ship and cooperation between the people's democracies and the Soviet Union!
6. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who are fighting
successfully for the socialist industrialization of the country, for an eco-
nomic and cultural advance, for the further development and strengthening of
their people's democratic system! Long live and flourish -the indissoluble,
fraternal friendship and cooperation of the Soviet and Chinese peoples—
a
mighty factor in maintaining peace and safeguarding the security of the peo-
ples of all countries!
7. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Korean People's
Democratic Republic, who have defended their native land from the interven-
tionists, who are fighting for economic restoration, for peace and for the
national unification of Korea on democratic lines!
8. Greetings to the democratic forces of Germany, fighting against
criminal plans to make Western Germany the nidus of a third world war! Long
live the German Democratic Republic— a reliable stronghold in the struggle
for a united, peace-loving, democratic Germany, for the preservation and
strengthening of peace!
9. Greetings to the Japanese people, courageously fighting for nation-
al independence, for democratic development of the motherland, against the
revival of Japanese militarism and the conversion of Japan into a military
springboard of the imperialists in the Far East!
10. Fraternal greetings to the peoples of the colonial and dependent
countries, fighting against the imperialist yoke, for their freedom and
national independence!
11. Long live the friendship of the peoples of Great Britain, the United
States of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle to ease world ten-
sion, avert war and secure lasting peace throughout the world!
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12. Long live the friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and
the peoples of France and Italy!
13. Long live the foreign policy of the Soviet Union—a consistent pol-
icy of maintaining and strengthening peace, a policy of struggle against
the preparation and unleashing of a new war, for the establishment of normal
relations and business ties among all countries!
14. Fighting men of the Soviet Army and Navy! Constantly increase your
military and political knowledge, perfect your combat skill, master new
equipment and arms! Long live and prosper the Soviet armed forces, covered
with the glory of victories, standing guard over the peace and security of
our motherland!
(The remaining slogans, 15-61, were concerned with domestic affairs and were
not relevant to this paper.)
Current Digest
,




PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE SLOGANS FOR THE 37TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION
(Pravda and Izvestia , Oct. 24, p. 1.)
1. Long live the 37th anniversary of the great October socialist revo-
lution!
2. Long live the international solidarity of the working people through-
out the world!
3. Fraternal greetings to all peoples fighting for peace, democracy,
socialism!
4. Working people of all countries! Peace will be maintained and con-
solidated if people take the matter of maintaining peace into their own hands
and defend it to the end! Strengthen unity among peoples in the struggle for
peace! Long live lasting peace among peoples!
5. Long live the mighty movement of peace partisans throughout the
world! Working people of all countries, struggle actively against the threat
of a new world war and for peaceful cooperation among peoples!
6. Working people of all countries! Struggle for the banning of atomic,
hydrogen and other weapons of mass annihilation and for a general curtailment
of armaments
!
7. May the solidarity of the peoples strengthen in the struggle against
the revival of German militarism, against the formation of aggressive mili-
tary alliances! For lasting peace and collective security for all European
peoples!
8. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democra-
cies, who are successfully fighting for the further development of national
economy, for a steady increase in peoples' wall-being and' for the construc-
tion of a socialist society! Long live and strengthen the indestructible
friendship and cooperation between the people's democracies and the Soviet
Union.
9. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who are success-
fully struggling for the development of their national economy and culture,
for the industrialization of the country, for the construction of the bases
of socialism! Long live and prosper the indestructible friendship and co-
operation between the Soviet and Chinese peoples—a powerful factor for peace
throughout the world!
10. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Korean People's
Democratic Republic, who are struggling for the restoration of its national
economy, for peace, for the national unification of Korea on democratic
foundations
!
11. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam, who are struggling for peace and democracy and for the restora-
tion of the national economy of their motherland!
12. Greetings to the peace-loving forces of Germany, which are struggling
against the criminal plans for converting West Germany into the center of a
third world war! Long live the German Democratic Republic—a reliable strong-
hold in the struggle to create a united, independent, democratic and peace-
loving Germany. May the indestructible friendship between the German and




13. May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet
Union and India extend and strengthen for the good of peace throughout the
world!
14. Fraternal greetings to the peoples of colonial and dependent coun-
tries, who are fighting against imperialist oppression, for their freedom
and national independence!
15. Long live the friendship between the peoples of Britain, the U.S.A.
and the Soviet Union in their struggle for further easing international ten-
sion, for averting a war and for guaranteeing lasting peace throughout the
world!
16. May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet
Union and the peoples of France and Italy strengthen in their struggle for
peace, against the revival of German militarism and for the establishment of
collective security in Europe!
17. Greetings to the Japanese people, who are courageously struggling
for national independence, for the democratic development of their mother-
land, against the revival of Japanese militarism and the conversion of Japan
into a military stronghold of the imperialists in the Far East!
18. Long live the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union—an
unwavering policy of the preservation and consolidation of peace, a policy
of struggle against the preparation for and unleashing of a new war, a policy
of international cooperation and the development of business relations with
all countries!
19. Servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy! Persistently raise your
military and political knowledge, perfect your combat skill, master new
equipment and armaments! Long live and strengthen the glorious victories
of the Soviet Armed Forces, which are standing guard over the peace and se-
curity of our motherland!
(The remaining slogans, 20-66, were concerned with domestic affairs and were
not relevant to this paper.)




MAY DAY SLOGANS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION
(Pravda and Izvestla
,
April 21, p. 1.)
1. Long live May Day—day of the international solidarity of working
people, day of brotherhood of the workers of all countries! Up with the
banner of proletarian internationalism! Proletarians of all countries, unite!
2. Fraternal greetings to all peoples struggling for peace, democracy
and socialism!
3. Working people of all countries! Peace will be preserved and
strengthened if the peoples take the cause of preserving peace into their
own hands and defend it to the last! Long live the unity of the peoples in
the struggle for peace! Long live lasting peace among peoples!
4. Long live the powerful movement of partisans of world peace! Work-
ing people of all countries, strive actively against the threat of a new
world war, for the peaceful cooperation of peoples! Augment and unify the
ranks of the partisans of peace!
5. Working people of all countries! Struggle for the banning of atomic,
hydrogen and other weapons of mass annihilation, for the universal reduction
of armaments!
6. May the solidarity of the peoples in the struggle against the re-
vival of German militarism be strengthened! For lasting peace and collective
security for all European peoples!
7. Working people of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies!
Let us answer the intrigues of the enemies of peace with further unification
of our force, increasing the economic and defensive might of the countries
in the democratic camp! Let us unite our efforts more closely in the strug-
gle for peace, against the threat of aggression!
8. Fraternal greetings to the Chinese, who are successfully struggling
to fulfill the First Five-Year Plan for the development of their national
economy, for the industrialization of the country and for building the bases
of socialism! Long live and flourish the indestructible friendship and co-
operation of the Soviet and Chinese peoples—a powerful factor in world peace!
9. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democra-
cies, who are struggling successfully for the further upsurge of national
economy and culture, for strengthening the might of the people's democratic
states and steadily improving the well-being of the peoples, for building
socialism! Long live and flourish the indestructible friendship and coopera-
tion of the people's democracies and the Soviet Union!
10. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Korean People's
Democratic Republic, struggling for the restoration of their national eco-
nomy, for peace and for the national unification of Korea on democratic
principles!
11. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam, struggling for peace and democracy, for the restoration of the
national economy of their country!
12. Greetings to the peace-loving forces of Germany, struggling against
the policy of turning Western Germany into the breeding ground of a third
world war! Long live the German Democratic Republic— the reliable stronghold




13. Greetings to the people of India! May the friendship and cooperation
between the people of the Soviet Union and India become stronger for the
good of world peace!
14. Greetings to the peoples of colonial and dependent countries, strug-
gling against the imperialist yoke and for their freedom and national in-
dependence.
15. Greetings to the peoples of Asia and Africa, struggling against
colonial and racial oppression and for the easing of international tension!
16. Long live the friendship and cooperation of the peoples of Britain,
the United States of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle to ease
international tension and to ensure peaceful coexistence between states and
lasting world peace!
17. May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet
Union and those of France and Italy become stronger in their struggle for
peace, against the revival of German militarism and for collective security
in Europe!
18. Greetings to the Japanese people, courageously striving for nation-
al independence, for the democratic development of their country, against the
revival of militarism and the conversion of Japan into a military spring-
board of the imperialists in the Far East!
19. Greetings to the Austrian people, who stand in favor of a democratic,
independent and peace-loving Austria!
20. Long live the U.S.S.R.'s peace-loving foreign policy—a consistent
policy of maintaining and consolidating peace, a policy of struggle against
the preparation and launching of a new war, a policy of international co-
operation and the development of business relations with all countries!
21. Servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy! Steadily increase your
military and political knowledge, perfect your combat skill, master the
latest military equipment and modern armaments! Long live and flourish the
valiant Soviet armed forces, crowned with the glory of their victories, who
are standing guard over the peace and security of our motherland!
(The remaining slogans, 22-69, were concerned with domestic affairs and were
not relevant to this paper.)
Current Digest
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PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE SLOGANS FOR THE 38TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION
(Pravda and Izvestia , Oct. 25, p. 1.)
1. Long live the 38th anniversary of the great October socialist revo-
lution!
2. Working people of all countries! Peace will be preserved and
strengthened if the peoples take the cause of preserving peace into their
own hands and defend it to the last! Strengthen the unity of peoples in
the struggle for peace!
3. Fraternal greetings to all peoples fighting for peace, democracy and
socialism!
4. Fighters for peace in all countries! Rally the mighty front of the
defenders of peace against the instigators of a new war; draw ever wider
masses of the people into the front; be vigilant against the intrigues of the
enemies of peace! Lift higher the banner of the struggle for peace and co-
operation among peoples!
5. Working people of all countries! Strive for the curtailing of
armaments! Demand the banning of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass
annihilations! Atomic energy—in the service of the cause of peace and the
progress of mankind!
6. For lasting peace and collective security for all European peoples!
7. Working people of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies!
Unceasingly strengthen the might of the camp of socialism and democracy— the
impregnable stronghold of peace; develop and strengthen fraternal friendship
and cooperation among the peoples of our countries!
8. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democra-
cies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania and the
Mongolian People's Republic, which are unselfishly struggling for the further
increase in the national economy and culture, for a steady rise in the well-
being of the masses of the people, for peace and for the building of social-
ism!
9. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who are successfully
struggling to fulfill the First Five-Year Plan for the development of their
national economy, for the industrialization of their country and cooperative
reform of its agriculture, for the construction of the foundations of social-
ism! Long live the Chinese People's Republic—a mighty world power! Long
live and flourish the indestructible friendship and cooperation between the
Soviet and Chinese peoples— a powerful factor for world peace!
10. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Korean People's
Democratic Republic, who are struggling for the restoration and further de-
velopment of their national economy, for peace, for the national unification
of Korea on democratic foundations!
11. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam, who are struggling for the restoration of their national economy,
for peace, for the national unification of Vietnam on democratic foundations!
12. Long live the German Democratic Republic— the stronghold of the
peace-loving forces of all Germany, who are struggling against the revival of
militarism, for the unification of their motherland on peaceful, democratic
foundations! May the friendship and cooperation between the German and Soviet
peoples grow strong and develop!
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13. Greetings to the peoples of the Federal People's Republic of Yugo-
slavia! May the fraternal friendship and cooperation between the people of
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia grow strong and prosper!
14. May the friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the
Republic of Finland, based on equal rights, mutual trust and respect for
the peoples, grow strong and prosper!
15. The Soviet people welcome the treaty restoring an independent and
democratic Austria! May the friendly relations between the peoples of
Austria and the Soviet Union grow strong and develop in the interests of last-
ing peace in Europe!
16. Greetings to the great Indian people! May the friendship and co-
operation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and India grow strong and
develop in the interests of peace throughout the world!
17. Greetings to the peoples of colonial and dependent countries,
struggling against imperialist oppression and for their freedom and national
independence!
18. Long live friendship and cooperation among the peoples of Britain,
the United States of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle to ease
international tension and to ensure peaceful coexistence among states and
lasting world peace!
19. May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet
Union and those of France and Italy grow stronger in their struggle for
peace, against the revival of German militarism and for collective security
in Europe!
20. Greetings to the working people of the German Federal Republic, who
are struggling against the forces of reaction and for peace and the security
of the peoples of Europe!
21. Greetings to the Japanese people, who are struggling against a re-
vival of militarism and for national independence and the democratic develop-
ment of economic and cultural relations with all countries!
22. Long live the U.S.S.R.'s peace-loving foreign policy—a consistent
policy of maintaining and consolidating peace, a policy of international co-
operation and the development of economic and cultural relations with all
countries!
23. Servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy! Steadily increase your mil-
itary and political knowledge, perfect your combat skill, master the latest
military equipment and modern armaments!
(The remaining slogans, 24-73, were concerned with domestic affairs and were
not relevant to this paper.)
Current Digest
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MAY DAY SLOGANS OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
(Pravda and Izyestia, April 19, p. 1.)
1. Long live May Day—day of the international proletarian solidarity
of working people, day of brotherhood of the workers of all countries! Up
with the banner of proletarian internationalism! Proletarians of all coun-
tries, unite!
2. Fraternal greetings to all peoples struggling for peace, democracy
and socialism!
3. Working people of all countries! War can and must be averted! Up
with the banner of the struggle against the danger of war and for peace and
cooperation between peoples!
4. Working people of all countries! Strive for reductions in arma-
ments and armed forces! Demand the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other
weapons of mass annihilation!
5. May the cooperation between Communists, Socialists and all progres-
sive forces grow stronger in the struggle for peace and democracy and the
independence of peoples!
6. Working people of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies!
Tirelessly strengthen the great collaboration between the countries of so-
cialism; develop and strengthen brotherly friendship between the peoples of
our countries!
7. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who are success-
fully carrying out socialist reforms in their country! Long live the Chinese
People's Republic! May the indestructible friendship and cooperation of the
Soviet and Chinese peoples flourish, as a mighty factor for world peace!
8. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the. people's democra-
cies: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania and the
Mongolian People's Republic, who are fighting for the further advance of
their national economy and culture, for a steady rise in the well-being of
the masses of the people, for peace and the building of socialism!
9. Fraternal greetings to the heroic peoples of the Korean People's
Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, who are strug-
gling for the restoration and further development of their national economy,
for peace, for the national unification of their countries on democratic
principles!
10. Long live the German Democratic Republic— the bulwark of the peace-
loving forces of all Germany, struggling against the revival of militarism
and for a rapprochement between the two German states and the unification of
their homeland on a peaceful, democratic basis! May the friendship and co-
operation between the German and Soviet peoples strengthen and develop in
the interests of peace in Europe!
11. Fraternal greetings to the people of the Federal People's Republic
of Yugoslavia, who are building socialism! Long live the indestructible
friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugo-
slavia!
12. Fraternal greetings to the great Indian people, fighting for the
progress of their homeland, for peace in Asia and throughout the world! May
the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and
India strengthen and develop.
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13. Long live the friendship and cooperation of the peoples of Britain,
the United States of America, France and the Soviet Union in their struggle
to ease international tension and to ensure the peaceful coexistence of
states, collective security in Europe and a firm peace throughout the world!
14. May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet
Union and Italy grow stronger!
15. Long live the friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union
and the Republic of Finland, based on equality of rights and mutual trust and
respect for the peoples!
16. May the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden,
Norway, Denmark and Iceland strengthen and develop!
17. Long live the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the
Soviet Union and neutral, independent, democratic Austria, for the sake of
strengthening peace in Europe!
18. Greetings to the Japanese people, fighting against the revival of
militarism and for national independence and the democratic development of
their country!
19. Warm greetings to the peoples of the East who have thrown off the
chains of colonial oppression, who are fighting for peace, freedom and the
strengthening of their national independence!
20. Greetings to the people of colonial and dependent countries strug-
gling against imperialist oppression and for their freedom and national in-
dependence!
21. Long live the Leninist policy of the peaceful coexistence of dif-
fering social systems—the general line of the Soviet Union's foreign policy,
a policy of maintaining and strengthening peace and of developing economic
and cultural ties with all countries!
22. Servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy! Steadily increase your
military and political knowledge, perfect your combat skill, master modern
military equipment and armaments! Long live the valiant Soviet armed forces,
crowned with the glory of their victories and standing guard over the peace
and security of our motherland!
(The remaining slogans, 23-75, were concerned with domestic affairs and were
not relevant to this paper.)
Current Digest
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THE POST-KHRUSHCHEV "COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP"










This study is an inquiry into the Soviet programs for the control
of its young people. The Soviets profess an interest in creating the
"new Soviet man" and state that the youth, if molded properly, will de-
velop into the "new Soviet man." Three fine studies have been published
on this subject: Merle Fainsod's Komsomol chapter in his book, How
Russia is Ruled ; Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr.'s study of Komsomol Congresses
1918-1952 Pattern for Soviet Youth ; and Allen Kasoff 's The Soviet Youth
Program which critically looks at Soviet efforts to mold their youth.
This paper will investigate the post-Khrushchev period of Komsomol
development with emphasis on the individual political leadership, the
objectives and current programs of the Komsomol, and this student's ob-
servations on the successes and failures of the Komsomol. It is hoped
that the reader will find this paper not n repetition of known data, but
rather a synthesis of the current available primary information in the
field. Since the student does not read Russian, translations are utilized





At the XXII Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress, a
new Program for the Communist Party was announced. The Program ended:
UNDER THE TESTED LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, UNDER
THE BANNER OF MARXISM-LENINISM, THE SOVIET PEOPLE HAVE BUILT
SOCIALISM.
UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY, UNDER THE BANNER OF
MARXISM-LENINISM, THE SOVIET PEOPLE WILL BUILD COMMUNIST
SOCIETY.
THE PARTY SOLEMNLY PROCLAIMS: THE PRESENT GENERATION OF
SOVIET PEOPLE WILL LIVE UNDER COMMUNISM
I
1
When the current collective leadership of the CPSU ousted Nikita Khrush-
chev in October, 1964, this commitment became part of their problems.
Though the time factor has been conspicuous by its absence from official
statements, the emphasis on communist construction has remained ever pres-
ent in official statements in the post-Khrushchev period.
There has been a steady increase of emphasis on ideological matters,
thus causing increased conflict with the intellectuals who had obtained
some degree of freedom under Khrushchev. Often closely associated with
the intellectuals is that potentially volatile segment of the population
— the young people. This paper proposes to investigate the current
regime's relations with the Soviet young people, particularly as reflected
by the activities of the mass youth organizations — the Ail-Union Lenin-
ist Communist League of Youth (often referred to as the Y.C.L. or Komsomol),
2
the Young Pioneers, and the Octobrists.
'Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Gruliow (ed.), Current Soviet Policies
,
IV (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 31.
The Komsomol became officially the "All-Union Leninist Communist
League of Youth at its Seventh Congress. It was the second name change
from the original, see Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr., Pattern for Soviet Youth
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 113. "Komsomol" was de-
rived from the first syllables of the original name — Communist League of
Youth — Koramunisticheskii souiz molodezhi. Fisher, p. 11.

Though the "older" young people have been in some degree volatile es-
3pecially with regard to the writers' trials of the 1966-1968 period, the
4larger mass of young people are seen as being apolitical by the regime.
To the regime they are as unsatisfactory as the rebellious ones, perhaps
more so. Speech after speech exhorts the young people to recognize the
values for which their fathers have made so many sacrifices and to vigor-
ously strive to carry on the unfinished "communist construction." At the
15th Y.C.L. Congress held in May, 1966, Brezhnev put it this way:
The farther the great days of October recede into the past
and the greater the number of youths and girls entering the
Communist ranks who have not experienced severe trials in life,
the more responsible become the tasks of ideological upbringing.
It is not, of course, a matter of exactly copying today
the revolutionaries of the early years of Soviet rule. Each
new generation of revolutionaries solves new historical tasks
and finds appropriate methods for this, its own style of strug-
gle and life which no one else can work out for it. We should
not copy the heroes of the past, but adopt the essence of their
revolution-tempered characters, adopt their revolutionary pas-
sion, their deep Communist conviction and boundless devotion to
the great cause of our party, their fiery romanticism and un-
quenchable hatred for the enemies of the revolution (applause)
;
adopt all this and apply it to the accomplishment of the diverse
tasks of communist construction that confront us today.
The Party recognizes the young people are the future and their beliefs
and values are a serious matter. Brezhnev at the XXIII Party Congress
Adam Brumberg, "Preface to In Quest of Justice, Part I," Problems of
Communism
,
XVII (July-August, 1968), p. 1-5.
See Current Digest of the Soviet Press , XX (1968), No. 43, p. 9 and
XXI (1969) No. 22, p. 8-9. (Hereinafter referred to as CDSP .) Also New
York Times
,
November 17, 1967, p. 12; March 2, 1969, p. 4; and September 2.
1969, p. 49. (Hereinafter referred to as NYT .
)
5CDSP
, XVIII (1966), No. 19, p. 3. See Appendix I for a list of CPSU
and Y.C.L. Congresses and dates.

stated that over half the population of the Soviet Union was under twenty-
six years old; roughly speaking that would be 120 million people. What
ties do those 120 million have with the Party? The Octobrists are 15 mil-
7 8
lion strong, the Young Pioneers have 23 million members, and the Y.C.L.
9
has 24 million members. Thus 52 million young people or about half the
young people are committed to some degree to the present Soviet system.
However, numbers alone do not indicate the true picture; membership and
belief are two very different concepts. By closer analysis of the youth
organizations, perhaps a better understanding of the Soviet youth can be
obtained.
The Octobrists are made up of ages 7-9 and could hardly be considered
a meaningful political force. A survey of translated Soviet Press
articles from 1964 to the present finds virtually no mention of them.
The Young Pioneers, ages 10-14, constitute one of the most success-
ful aspects of the Soviet youth work. Practically all students belong
12
to the Young Pioneers; it is difficult not to. Sergei Pavlov, Y.C.L.
6
Ibid. , No. 13, p. 6.
Ibid
.
, XX, No. 5, p. 5. Also referred to as Little Octobrists, they
were re-established in 1957 after disappearing on the eve of World War II.
Allen Kassof , The Soviet Youth Program (Cambridge: Harvard University




XX, No. 5, p. 5.
9







Richard V. Allen (ed.), Yearbook On International Communist Affairs ,
1968 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), p. 583.

First Secretary, in 1967, stated all school children belonged, but this
13
was a generalization. Entry into the Pioneers is a ceremonial occasion,
including a "solemn promise" — a sort of loyalty oath to the Party, taken
in the presence of one s schoolmates.
The Young Pioneers are the only group that has a distinctive uni-
form. Their interests are readily adaptable to patriotic ends, i.e.
hikes to museums and battlefields, parades, study of revolutionary heroes,
etc. However, shortcomings do exist. In 1958 a Central Council was set
up by the Y.C.L. to coordinate Young Pioneer activities nationwide; pre-
viously Young Pioneer troops had been dependent on local Y.C.L. groups.
In 1960 the Y.C.L. decided to renovate Artek — the showplace summer camp
in the Crimea. These last two actions may have gone awry over the years.
A Pravda article in June, 1969, discussed how Artek has become overcrowded,
its activities formalized and stilted, and the Central Council has become
18
"numbers conscious" in its summer programs. Turnover of Artek' s staff
workers has been 75 percent in the past five years; two-thirds of its unit
19
counselors are replaced annually. Rather than maintaining its dynamic
13
For Pavlov's speech, see CDSP
,
XIX (1967), No. 5, p. 7. Allen,
p. 583 indicates this is not true. Also statistics on school population
in 1968 indicate Pavlov exaggerated. CDSP , XX, No. A3, p. 10.
14
Leonid Vladimirov, The Russians (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Inc., 1968), p. 38.
15
The uniform was redesigned in 1966. CDSP , XVIII, No. 47, p. 38.
Ibid
.
, XIX, No. 5, p. 34.
17








5qualities, its programs have ossified. Nor is this the only area of
trouble in Young Pioneer activities. Y.C.L. leadership of and participa-
tion in the Young Pioneer program has been criticized for several years —
20
particularly in 1966. There is little interest in working with the
21
Pioneers and the burden of leadership has fallen on the schoolteachers.
22
Only one sixth of the country's teachers are Y.C.L. members; one won-
ders how enthusiastically most Young Pioneers are led. After the in-
creased attention of the Y.C.L. Central Committee was directed to the
23
Young Pioneers, Y.C.L. interest should have improved. Some indication
that it has not came in spring 1968. The Y.C.L. announced the First All-
Union Atheist Young Pioneer Convention would be held at Artek. Province
Y.C.L. committees did such a shoddy job of picking representatives that
only 50 of the 950 sent showed some knowledge of the subject and even
24
some "believers" were sent! The low level of political awareness of
the Young Pioneers is probably the only reason the regime does not have
serious problems in this age group.
Advancement to Y.C.L. membership (for ages 14-28 plus those who hold
"elected" offices) is another ceremonial occasion in the Soviet youth
25
program. Admission standards are higher than for the Young Pioneers,
20




, No. 19, p. 33. In 1967 the N. K. Krupskaya medal for teachers
and workers in public education and pedagogy who achieve particular dis-
tinction in the instruction and upbringing of youth was established. Thirty
medals per year were to be awarded. Ibid
.
, XIX, No. 31, p. 28.
22





Current Abstracts of the Soviet Press , II (1969), No. 1, p. 15.
25
Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Revised Ed.; Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1963), p. 294.

7f>
but it is far from being exclusive. The number of Y.C.L. members in
27
the 14-17 year old bracket has risen in recent years, perhaps in recog-
nition of the fact that a Y.C.L. card is essential if one is to have any
hope of getting into a higher school and remaining in it. An emigre from
the Ukraine interviewed in Israel stated:
I do not believe you have one single student in the Soviet
Union who is not a Comsomoletz or Comsomolka . In theory, all
one needs to enter a university is good marks, not a Comsomol
ticket. But in actual practice, one is not allowed to register
for exams without a letter of recommendation from the Comsomol
bureau. Expulsion from the Comsomol brings about instant ex-
pulsion from the University too, and vice versa. °
One recent case was reported where an individual was expelled from the
Y.C.L., then dropped from his last year at the institute. He went to work
in a chemical plant, joined another Y.C.L. organization, and attempted to
get reinstated at the institute. His past was discovered and he was
29
promptly expelled from the Y.C.L. again.
In September, 1967, the Y.C.L. revealed "70% of the members of the
Y.C.L. are under 22 years of age, including more than 30% who are under
30
eighteen." This also supports the contention that Y.C.L. membership






XVIII, No. 21, p. 3. Y.C.L. committees are often involved in
"rigging" entrance examinations, NYT, September 21, 1969, p. 13 and CDSP
,
XVII, No. 12, p. 32 and CDSP , XVIII, No. 29, p. 34-35.
28
Leo Heiman, "Ukrainian Universities: Dreams and Reality," The
Ukrainian Quarterly , XXV (1969), No. 2, p. 150.
29
NYT, November 18, 1969, p. 18.
30
CDSP, XIX, No. 38, p. 32.

7Having indicated that Y.C.L. membership may be less than sincerely
motivated, a consideration of the tasks assigned this organization is in
order. Sergei Pavlov, the then First Secretary, said at the 15th Y.C.L.
Congress:
The main content of the work of the Leninist Young Commun-
ist League has been and continues to be:
-the rearing of thoroughly developed and educated young peo-
ple loyal to the revolutionary ideals, to the fighting and work-
ing traditions of the Soviet people and the Communist Party; the
molding of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, of high moral quali-
ties and of deep ideological conviction among young people;
-thorough intensification of the social and political active-
ness of the young generation, intensification of its practical
participation in communist construction, in the development of
the economy, science, and culture;
-inculcation of Soviet patriotism, of the noble feeling of
friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and of readiness to
defend the achievements of October and the sacred frontiers of
the socialist homeland with arms in hand;
-inculcation of loyalty to internationalist duty to the work-
ing people of the world and of militant irreconcilability in the
struggle against bourgeois ideology and imperialism's
intrigues. ^
The Party Central Committee (in 1968) passed a resolution commemorating
the 50th Anniversary of the Y.C.L. that said basically the same thing,
only in more verbose language. One of the phrases does get more explicit
to train a generation of comprehensively developed and high-
ly educated people, staunch and selfless fighters for the victory
of communism, people capable of managing the affairs of society and
the state. 32
In summary the Y.C.L. tasks are ideological indoctrination of the young
people and intensification of the production efforts of the economy. In
the reality of day-to-day existence, these broad tasks get specified to
the point that every task that arises and every resolution that is
announced includes the Y.C.L. (and usually trade unions, Soviets, etc.)
31
Ibid. , XVIII, No. 21, p. 3
32
Ibid. , XX, No. 41, p. 11.

33
as part of those responsible for accomplishing the task. Rather than
burdening down the Y.C.L., often a situation of ambiguous responsibility
is created that results in many tasks merely being paid lip service or
34
started with enthusiasm only to have interest wither away. Herein lies
part of the problem of the Y.C.L. Initially it was an elite group with
highly motivating tasks — the Civil War, the collectivization of agricul-
ture, the early industrialization of the state. In 1936 the organization
was changed to a mass organization and thereby lost much of its elite
35
appeal. The Great Patriotic War and the Virgin Lands program did pro-
vide some motivation for the Y.C.L. members and maintain their dedication
to the Y.C.L. In recent years the tangible motivating cause has been con-
struction of public works in the underdeveloped areas of the country.
There are more than one hundred of these projects currently active.
These have a certain glamour and prestige and instill a sense of adventure.
but their many associated shortcomings have tended to produce negative
attitudes in the Soviet youth.
33
Here, for example, are some sample tasks: Y.C.L. "through their
creative labor, will multiply even more the economic and military might of
the country," CDSP
,
XIX, No. 1, p. 14; Y.C.L. "must expand socialist com-
petition among public-catering workers," Ibid
.
, XIX, No. 10, p. 10-11;
Y.C.L. was expected to insure that the 1969 harvest would be excellent,
Ibid
.
, XXI, No. 24, p. 15; Y.C.L. was to help improve tourist facilities,
Ibid
.
, XXI, No. 26, p. 14; and Public Health Legislation charged Y.C.L.
for observance of working conditions of adolescents, Ibid
.
, XXII (1970),
No. 1, p. 12.
34
Ibid. , XVII, No. 15, p. 9-10; XIX, No. 5, p. 5; and XXI, No. 4,
p. 13-15.
35
Herbert McClosky and John E. Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 268.
36
CDSP, XX, No. 43, p. 9.

9Perhaps the most serious incident occurred in 1959 when frustration
over the poor food at the Karaganda Industrial Complex project resulted in
a three-day riot led by fifty of the Komsomol recruits there. The riot
was finally quelled by army troops; more than one hundred were reported
37killed. No recent accounts of violence have come to light, but the
Soviet press has carried many reports of bad living conditions, inadequate
equipment, lack of supplies, and instability in the labor force. For
example; at an Irkutsk project, only one-tenth of those sent in the last
seven years have remained at the project. On the Khrebtovaya-Ust-Ilem
railroad project, 937 arrived and 726 left in 1966. In the first six
39
months of 1967, 378 arrived, 507 left. In light of these figures, the
statement that "more than 1,800,000 young men and women have worked at
the country's new construction projects on Y.C.L. assignments" in the
40
past twelve years loses some of its impressiveness . It has been sug-
gested that these Y.C.L. contingents are the modern replacement for the
41
secret police's slave labor of the 1930' s. Some credence for that idea
comes from the reports of poor recruitment practices that have resulted in
42
people recently released from prison being sent to the projects. The
37
John Scott, "Soviet Youth Today," Bulletin (Institute for the Study
of the USSR), XIV (December, 1967), p. 13. (Hereinafter the periodical




CDSP, XIX, No. 26, p. 21.
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CDSP , XX, No. 9, p. 36 and No. 26, p. 21.

10
attitudes of some local jurisdictions have also supported this "free labor"
idea. In 1969 Izvestia reported that in some areas administrators would
not allow "their" students to be sent outside "their" domain. The economic
manager then had a manpower reserve that he did not have to devote atten-
tion or resources to because they were from the same locality. Lack of
interested guidance and poor working conditions then resulted in low pro-
ductivity — as much as five times lower than when students went out of
43
"their" area. Despite these problems, the Y.C.L. is committed to sup-
44
porting construction projects for some time to come.
One last observation with regard to the summer construction projects
must be made. Marina Zhuravleva, then a Y.C.L. Central Committee Secre-
tary, in January 1967, complained that the higher school construction de-
tachments worked productively and responsibly all summer only to return
to school and be dictated to and "not allowed to take one step indepen-
45dently in the institute." This received support from non-Party spokes-
men in the months that followed. This policy of dependence on students'
output as summer worker, followed by the democratic centralism of the
Y.C.L. organization, is not likely to develop a love for the communist way
of life as practiced by the current regime. However, the essence of the








XX, No. 43, p. 9.
45
Ibid. XIX, No. 2, p. 33-34.
46
Ibid
., XIX, No. 3, p. 23-24 and XIX, No. 26, p. 20-21.

11
of the officials both in the Party and in the Y.C.L. is involved; formal-
ism and routine approaches to all tasks are too often the general practice.
Leonid Vladimirov in The Russians wrote that Komsomolskaya Pravda
conducted public opinion polls in 1960, then suppressed the results because
they were so upsetting — they indicated Komsomol activities were con-
sidered dull and yielded only "meetings, dues, and paper forms." In
February, 1965 an article written by a Y.C.L. Central Committee member
criticized the lack of official attention to the "aspirations and concerns
of the Young Communists themselves." "The Young Communists do not exist
for the meetings, but the meetings for the Young Communists, for discussing
their hopes and their needs." Agendas were too often "spotted with such
'urgent' questions and 'burning' issues as 'On tasks in the light of -,'
'On the course of the fulfillment of -,' 'On summing up the results of -,'
'On improving -. '" Participation was limited to Y.C.L. officials and
representatives of the administration. Little wonder the Y.C.L. attendance
figures are poor — Tula province had 37 Y.C.L. organizations whose meet-
49
ings were attended by fewer than half the membership. This was not an
isolated example. Forms of coercion have often been employed to assure
attendance. Y.C.L. cards are collected at the factory entrance and return-






XVII (1965), No. 15, p. 7-8.
49
Ibid. , No. 15, p. 9.
5
°Ibid. , XVII, No. 15, p. 9; XVIII, No. 3, p. 29; XIX, No. 2, p. 34;
and XIX, No. 48, p. 33.
51
Ibid. , XVII, No. 15, p. 9.

12
Y.C.L. Committee in 1966, the doors were locked to prevent participants
from leaving.
The dissatisfaction is not limited to meetings. One public opinion
poll in Smolensk indicated that students were complaining of heavy home-
work loads (a complaint not peculiar to the U.S.S.R.) that left them with
no interest in doing anything at all once their studies were completed.
53
The analyst concluded "boredom and laziness" were being fostered.
Another study stated that five to nine hours a week were spent watching
54
television for lack of anything else to do. These and other polls pro-
duce the general impression that the youth have inadequate facilities to
pursue their interests or to develop new interests. This leads to bore-
dom and drinking, producing eventually troublemakers or "social dropouts."
The regime has reacted by calling for better use of existing facili-
ties and for more ideologically oriented work in the various media. Tele-
vision and the theater have been criticized for not presenting more pro-
grams concerning ideological and patriotic themes. The Y.C.L. in 1969
participated in a joint plenary session of the boards of the U.S.S.R.
creative unions in Moscow where it was concluded that: "Taught by the
52
Ibid. , XVIII, No. 29, p. 40.
53
Ibid. , XVII, No. 31, p. 13.
54
Ibid. , XXI, No. 22, p. 8.
55
Ibid. , XVII, No. 31, p. 13; XVII, No. 46, p. 14; XX, No. 4, p. 12-13;
and XXI, No. 22, p. 8-9.
56
Ibid. , XVII, No. 37, p. 42; XVII, No. 46, p. 9; XVII, No. 51, p.
35-36; XIX, No. 5, p. 6; XIX, No. 34, p. 10; XIX, No. 47, p. 27; XXI, No. 13,
p. 31; and XXI, No. 36, p. 17-18.

13
Party and following its policy on art, the writers help our people to
realize the historic tasks of the building of a communist society."
Time and again the Y.C.L. has indicated that the proper upbringing of the
CO
"new Soviet man" requires a proper model be presented in the media.
The writers, particularly those published in Yunost and Novy Mir
,
have been accused of presenting disparaging descriptions of Soviet youth
59
and their ideals. "Bourgeois" influences are seen in the actions of
youth — the transistor radios, miniskirts, the "twist," etc. In the
post-Khrushchev era, both Pavlov and Tyazhelnikov have pointed out the dan-
gers of bourgeois influences and the massive efforts the "imperialists"
are putting forth in an effort to influence the Communist youth. The
trials of Daniel and Siniavsky, followed by the underground publications
— such as Phoenix 66
,
and culminating in the trials of Ginsburg, Galan-
skov, and others demonstrated to the current regime the validity of their
concern. The trials of the young writers had hardly been completed
when the Czechoslovakian situation began building to a crisis. After the
Czechoslovakian invasion, in remarks at the Y.C.L. 's 50th Anniversary
celebration (October, 1968), Brezhnev proclaimed the wisdom of the regime's
recent increased emphasis on the strengthening of patriotic internationalism.
57




, XVII, No. 10, p. 19-20; XVII, No. 48, p. 5-6; XVIII, No. 8,
p. 20; XVIII, No. 19, p. 5; and XXI, No. 11, p. 15.
59
CDSP , XVIII, No. 1, p. 9-12 and XXI, No. 36, p. 3-6.
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NYT, May 7, 1967, IV, p. 2; August 13, 1969, p. 13; October 26, 1968,
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NYT, November 17, 1967. CDSP , XX, No. 22, p. 11.

14
ideological staunchness, and the ability to ward off all forms of bour-
geois influence: "The course of events in the world in recent months
has quite convincingly shown how well-founded and timely these tasks
,,63
are ...
Two items of focus for the regime's attention regarding bourgeois
influences within the Soviet Union have been the organization known as
SMOG (Society of Young Geniuses) and the individuals described as
64
stilyagi . SMOG first came into prominence for its activities in demon-
strations protesting the arrest and trial of Daniel and Siniavsky. These
demonstrations continued until early 1968 (Ginsberg et al. trials).
Little has been written about the organization recently; one incident was
reported in May, 1969 in Moscow concerning two Scandinavian girls who
claimed to be members of an organization associated with SMOG. SMOG
has become known to the non-Communist world as a clandestine, dissident in-
tellectual youth group located principally in Moscow with sections in
Odessa, Leningrad, and the Urals.
The stilyagi are the non-conformists in dress that wear tight pants,
68
fancy shirts, etc. They have received excessive abuse from the
63
CDSP, XX, No. 43, p. 9.
64
Vladimirov, p. 44-45. SMOG also can represent the first letters of










druzhinniki , volunteer auxiliary police under Y.C.L. leadership. The
regime supports these Y.C.L. activists in their fight against "bourgeois"
decadence; no criticism, or even mention of the druzhinniki , is seen in
the Soviet press. Only general comments of militia leaders concerning
their need for Y.C.L. support and cooperation are voiced.
The Communists do not release any meaningful figures on the problems
of youth and crime, but the comments of the press and the frequency of
meetings on the subject indicate there is a real problem with juvenile de-
linquency. Juvenile delinquency is highly related to the significant
72
problem of "dropouts" from the Soviet education system. The Party was
committed to universal secondary schooling by 1970, but they are still
73
calling for Y.C.L. help in achieving this. It is doubtful that this
goal will be accomplished in the near future.
One area that has received increased emphasis in the post-Khrushchev
period is that of military-patriotic upbringing. In late 1967 a new
69
Ibid
., p. 45-47; Scott, p. 13-14; and NYT, February 21, 1968, p. 2.
7 CDSP
,
XIX, No. 47, p. 20.
71
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p. 5-6; and XXI, No. 18, p. 8-14.
72
Ibid. , XXI, No. 40, p. 20. In 1968 the U.S.S.R. Minister of Educa-
tion stated about 80% of all students finished eight year schools. That
means greater than 20% "drop out." Ibid
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, XXI, No. 18, p. 5-6. For a detailed treatment of the recent
problems of the Soviet educational system, see Jeremy Azrael, "Bringing Up
the Soviet Man: Dilemmas and Progress," Problems of Communism
,
XVII (May-




Universal Military Service law was adopted. It reduced actual active
military service, but added pre-induction training which offset the liberal-
ization of the law. The bureaucracy was not able to keep up with the
change; Izvestia pointed out in September, 1967 many shortcomings in
training facilities and organization of the pre-induction program.
The military have made many claims about the high percentages of
Party and Y.C.L. members in both officer and enlisted ranks; 93 percent
and 80 percent, respectively. These percentages are so much higher than
any of the figures for civilian classifications that it seems a great deal
of pressure to join the Party or Y.C.L. must be put on people once they
are in the Armed Forces. The traditional Party desire for complete con-
trol of the military is one explanation of the situation; another is that
having personnel in the Y.C.L. while they are in the Armed Forces makes
it easier to pressure them into "volunteering" to work on Y.C.L. construc-
tion projects or in agriculture when they leave the service. Whether
the people do "volunteer" upon leaving the service or not, the regime
feels the more ideological training it subjects people to while in the
service, the better citizens they will be in later life.
The Y.C.L. is interested in recruiting people to send to the country-
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members are in the rural areas. This is only one-third of the Y.C.L.
membership. Overall Soviet population percentages indicate 46.2 percent
79
of the population are located in the rural areas. At the November 1969
All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers, Tyazhelnikov (Y.C.L. First Secre-
tary) committed the Y.C.L. to more intensive efforts in its rural work:
We promise the Party Central Committee and the Soviet govern-
ment that in the very near future new thousands of Y.C.L. members
will be machine operators and land-reclamation specialists and
will take up the other technical professions that are so necessary
to agriculture. °® (underlining mine)
The meaning of the "promise" is not altogether clear. It is the only time
in post-Khrushchev period that this writer has seen a Y.C.L. First Secre-
tary go so far as to "promise" anything, especially something that on the
surface seems so difficult to fulfill. He did hedge with regard to the
time involved, but the speech on the whole seemed to convey a more con-
81
cerned attitude toward rural work.
The continuing migration to the city by the young rural worker seek-
82
ing a better life exacerbates the problem of improving agriculture,
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Pavlov, in 1966 when he was Y.C.L. First Secretary, had vigorously
supported the idea of more machine operators, but he never "promised" any-
thing. Ibid ., XVIII, No. 21, p. 8.
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Party ) . The dream of high wages and a five day work week plus the many
cultural advantages readily draw the rural worker to the cities.
The five day work week has introduced further problems for the regime.
Despite the subbotnik practice and other demands on the worker's time, he
84
has leisure time he has never known before. There are not enough lei-
sure facilities and boredom has resulted. Unable to make use of this new
leisure time, the worker has turned to drinking which the Party feels
o c
leads to potential criminal tendencies. To make up for the lack of lei-
sure facilities, the Party has turned to the trade unions and Y.C.L. and
directed them to promote pursuit of educational opportunities after work.
This additional education is to raise the level of ideological and moral
upbringing of the labor generation, thus the regime takes care of two prob-
lems at once. Whether the worker will participate as the regime desires
remains to be seen.
What can be said of CPSU-Y.C.L. relations? The Y.C.L. officially is
a "mass, non- Party" organization that is independent of the Party but acts
87
as its faithful assistant and loyal reserve. In practice, as has been
indicated in this paper, the Y.C.L. is subservient to the Party. While
being in the Y.C.L. does not insure Party membership, it does help. Since
the XXIII Party Congress, the Y.C.L. is the only method of entry into the
Ibid ., XX, No. 45, p. 14-15.
84
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Party below age 23. In 1967 the Party published statistics on the num-
89ber of Y.C.L. members accepted to candidate membership in the CPSU:
Y.C.L. Overall
1952 - 1955 605,164 out of 2,494,052 accepted
1956 - 1961 1,694,023 out of 3,557,596 accepted
1962 - 1966 1,670,546 out of 4,240,381 accepted
(More recent figures are not available.)
The article implied the Y.C.L. drop in the 1962 - 1966 period was due to
a tightening of membership standards. Brezhnev indicated at the XXIII
Congress that there would be tightening of standards for Party membership
in the future; whether this was also to apply for membership in the Y.C.L.
90
is unknown. A drop in the growth rate of the Y.C.L. itself has occurred
as shown by the following table:
Date Total Members Growth Rate
April, 1962 19,400,000, nrm nnn
May, 1966 23 000 000 " " "
9 °°>°°° per year
April, 1969 24,000,000 } 333 >
000 ?er year
(For information on the size of the Y.C.L. through the years, see
Appendix II.)
Apparently the Y.C.L. has also been trying to improve the quality of its
membership. The increased emphasis on ideological matters in the Y.C.L.
supports this speculation.
Y.C.L. work is considered to be one of the most dependable ladders for
91
promotion to positions in the Party or government hierarchy. Perhaps the
88
T. H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1967
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 321.
89
CDSP, XIX, No. 43, p. 10, 12.
90
Ibid ., XVIII, No. 13, p. 7.
91
S. Voronitsyn, "The Present Composition of the Party Central Com-
mittee: A Brief Sociological Analysis," Bulletin , XVI (June, 1969), p. 27.

20
best case study is the Y.C.L. First Secretaryship. The Y.C.L. First Secre-
tary has been identified a Category II (out of a possible three) assign-
92
ment within the nomenklatura system. A typology of the First Secretary
can be suggested from a study of the known biographical data of the six men
who have held the office (see Appendix III for the biographies) . A brief
comparison is presented here for the reader's benefit:
Previous Yrs.
First Sec. CPSU Age in Y.C.L.
Komsomol Member Born Office Tenure CPSU Work
Unidentified 1918-1929
*Kosarev 1929-1938 1919 1903 26-35 9 years 10 11
Mikhailov 1938-1952 1930 1906 32-46 14 years 8 6?
Shelepin 1952-1958 1952 1918 34-42 8 years 12 16?
Semichastny 1958-1959 1956 1924 34 5 months 14 17
Pavlov 1959-1968 1954 1929 30-39 9 years 5 18?
Tyazhelnikov 1968-Present ? 1928 40-41+ I2 years ? ?
*Kosarev was purged by Stalin in 1938. J
The First Secretary works his way up through the Y.C.L., usually in-
cluding one assignment in the Moscow area and a period of training as a
Secretary of the All-Union Y.C.L. Central Committee before becoming First
Secretary. Once "elected" (at an age of 30-34) as First Secretary, he re-
mains in the post about 9 years. CPSU membership has been enjoyed for up
to 10 years prior to being elected. The first two Secretaries had no formal
higher education, but the last four have had some or full university educa-
94
tion. Many ex officio titles are associated with the First Secretaryship
92
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1965, p. 51-52. The author credits Professor Avtorkhanov with having pro-
vided him with the "Categories." A brief description of the nomenklatura




It is not known whether Tyazhelnikov has a university education, but




— Full Member of Central Committee of the CPSU, Deputy of the Supreme
Soviet, and other less important titles. Upon completing the Y.C.L. First
Secretary assignment, a promotion usually into Party or government work is
received. Within a few years after leaving the Y.C.L. work, his career
peaks, then declines to some fairly stable position in the bureaucracy (the
retention in the bureaucracy is due to the nomenklatura system). Currently,
Mikhailov is Chairman of the State Press Committee; Shelepin is Chairman of
the All-Union Central Trade Unions Council; Semichastny is Deputy Premier
of the Ukrainian Republic's Council of Ministers; and Pavlov is Chairman of
the Committee for Physical Culture and Sport of the Council of Ministers
which represents a promotion from Chairman, Central Council of Union of
Sports Societies and Organizations, his first job after being Y.C.L. First
95
Secretary. He may still be on the way up, but because of his educational
background — Moscow Institute of Physical Training — he probably has
reached his peak.
Though little is known of Tyazhelnikov, he does appear to be a signifi-
cant variation from the typology. He was forty years old when elected
First Secretary and had no Y.C.L. experience for at least the ten previous
years. He had been in Chelyabinsk for at least ten years and since 1964
had been merely a secretary on the Party oblast committee. His election
violated the Y.C.L. Statutes since he did not belong to the All-Union Y.C.L.
95
Pavlov's transfer was announced, CDSP , XX, No. 24, p. 27. The cur-
rent assignments of the former Y.C.L. First Secretaries were obtained from
the September, 1968 and September, 1969 Supplements to the September, 1968
and September, 1969 Bulletins
,
respectively. It is worthy of note that
Shelepin was replaced as head of the KGB by Semichastny. Pavlov's post-
Y.C.L. assignments indicate that the Y.C.L. is not to become a training




Central Committee. A tenuous link to Brezhnev can be made through N. N.
97
Rodionov, the Chelyabinsk obkom first secretary. Tyazhelnikov has, to
date, achieved some of the ex officio positions associated with being Y.C.L.
First Secretary. In August, 1968 he was "elected" as a Deputy to the
Council of Union of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet to fill the vacancy created
98by the death of the Orenburg City Deputy. In December he was elected as
99
a member of the Council of Union's standing committee on youth affairs.
He has not been elected to the CC,CPSU, but this will probably be accomp-
lished at the XXIV CPSU Congress (when it is finally held) . He was elected
as one of the 96 members of the Presidium of the All-Union Congress of Col-
lective Farmers, the same Congress at which he made a "promise" for the
Y.C.L. It has been noted that Tyazhelnikov was responsible for the de-
velopment of a "city scientific society of pupils" in Chelyabinsk which
was very successful and popular with the students; however, there has been
Christian Duevel, "Shake-Up of the Komsomol Leadership," Radio
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no indication of this kind of initiative by him since he became First
102
Secretary.
Tyazhelnikov has appeared as Y.C.L. leader at various official con-
ferences, meetings, etc., dutifully providing the Soviet young people with
"representation," but actually repeating the Party line and committing the
Y.C.L. , and Soviet youth, to the position the Party desires supported. This
"role" of the Y.C.L. First Secretary as the representative of Soviet youth
is but one of the many "roles" the Y.C.L. First Secretary plays in his day-
to-day existence. He is the communications link between the CPSU Secretar-
iat and the Y.C.L. Central Committee. He is chief spokesman for the Y.C.L.
Central Committee and the 24 million Y.C.L. members, and to some extent
the younger youth movements. He heads Soviet youth delegations to interna-
tional youth conferences. He and the Y.C.L. Central Committee are also the
Party's handy "whipping boys" for any shortcomings of the Y.C.L. or Soviet
youth work.
The First Secretary's speeches laud the Party for its guidance,
102
Duevel, p. 5. A Y.C.L. Secretary, Torsuyev, in Fall, 1968 proposed
that an alliance of schools, science, production, and the Y.C.L. be set up.
It was to be called the All-Union Young People's Scientific and Technolog-
ical Society (CDSP, XX, No. 34, p. 30.). But in January, 1967 Zhuravleva
had proposed an All-Union Student Scientific Society be established (CDSP ,
XIX, No. 2, p. 34.). Therefore, it is unlikely that Tyazhelnikov was
trying to repeat his Chelyabinsk success, though Torsuyev' s proposal may
have been a trial balloon to see if there was any support for the general
concept. Nothing more has been heard about the proposal; it would have to




occasionally asking for even more guidance (read "dictation"). The
speeches are filled with ample amounts of criticism of various govern-
mental agencies that are involved with young people. Criticism is also
made of the work of the lower Y.C.L. bodies. Seldom does he criticize the
Y.C.L. Central Committee itself. Rarely do the speeches indicate any
initiative or propose new programs that have not already been proposed by
the Party. Occasionally foreign affairs are referred to, especially if an
international youth meeting is soon to be held. Thus the role of the First
Secretary can be seen on the surface as being relatively easy in that he
merely repeats the Party line as it comes down from "on high."
However, the subject of young people is so politically sensitive and
so complex that the Y.C.L. First Secretaryship must be considered a very
demanding assignment. To obtain the assignment some political favor appears
to be required. To use the assignment as a political stepping stone re-
quires no small degree of political dexterity and propitious timing, es-
pecially since the advantage in the constant struggle within the CPSU can
easily shift to a faction that may be at odds with the latest public state-
ment that the Y.C.L. First Secretary has made. Due to its amorphous nature,
the Y.C.L. is a handy scapegoat; some shortcoming is always available for
criticism. This, in turn, means the Y.C.L. leadership is always available
103
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for criticism. Y.C.L. tasks are primarily qualitative, not quantitative.
This qualitative aspect makes it very difficult to be any kind of real suc-
cess as First Secretary, particularly with regard to ideological work which
has been stated again and again as the Y.C.L.'s principal task. Thus
while the Y.C.L. First Secretaryship may be a valuable opportunity for an
aspiring young Communist, it may well hinder his later progress. Only one
real success story has had the assignment — Shelepin.
With the election of Tyazhelnikov, who was at least six years older
(age 40) than any other First Secretary at the time of election, there may
be a new trend toward an older medium-grade Party official who will play a
routine role and not rise much above the Y.C.L. First Secretaryship ever in
his career. This speculation, however, may be premature.
The post-Khrushchev collective leadership has been subjected to many
demonstrations of protest from the young people and this may have caused
reappraisals of their approach to Soviet youth. Nevertheless, the regime
remains committed to the Y.C.L. as the leader of Soviet youth. Various
efforts have been made to support the Y.C.L. and aid it in its relations
with young people. At the XXIII Party Congress the CPSU Statutes were
changed to state:
Young persons up to 23 years of age inclusive may join the
Party only via the Young Communist League. Y.C.L. members enter-
ing the C.P.S.U. shall submit a recommendation from a district or
city Y.C.L. committee, which is equal to the recommendation of
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This probably indicated the need for better ideological background in the
20 to 23 year olds and fits with the Party's tightening up of its stan-
dards.
The nationwide slogans for May Day and the Anniversary of the October
Revolution provide more indications of the Party's intention to remain com-
mitted to the Y.C.L, and its work with Soviet Youth. For the Anniversary
of the October Revolution in 1967, the number of slogans were reduced from
over one hundred and ten to fifty-seven and the format was rearranged to de-
emphasize the foreign policy aspects the slogans had become known for. The
standard three slogans concerned with young people — one about the Y.C.L.
,
one about young men and women, and one about Young Pioneers and school
children — were promoted from the very end of the list to the middle of
the list, Numbers 24, 25, and 26, respectively. The overall number of
slogans has varied from fifty-two to fifty-seven since October, 1967.
From May Day 1968 to the October 1969 list of slogans, the Y.C.L. slogan
has been Number 15 or 16 while the other two have varied from Number 33 and
34 to Number 37 and 38. (See Appendix IV.)
Within the Y.C.L. itself, the major shakeup of the All-Union Y.C.L.
Central Committee in June, 1968, including the election of a new First Sec-
retary, may also be related to the idea of a renewed commitment to the
Y.C.L. To the disappointment of the Soviet Union's liberal elements,
the Y.C.L. since June, 1968, has emphasized anew the ideological and mil-
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to the new Universal Military Service Law, but it may be part of a return
to the heavy industry-strong military attitudes that were associated with
Stalin and with Khrushchev when he struggled with Malenkov.
Other manifestations of the Party's concern over its control of the
young people were provided in October, 1968 by the CPSU's Central Committee
resolution "On the 50th Anniversary of the Y.C.L. and Tasks of Communist
Upbringing of Young People." It called for the establishment of stand-
ing committees on the affairs of young people. These were to be created
by all Soviets, from the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet on down. It also proposed
a higher Y.C.L. School be created. More emphasis was to be given to Party
work with Y.C.L. organizations to promote the communist upbringing of the
younger generation, specifically the Party and Y.C.L.
must constantly develop and guide young people's interests
toward political knowledge and their desire for profound under-
standing of the processes of social life.-'-'-'"
An increased number of promotions, in all phases of the Soviet society,
were to be given to those Y.C.L. members who had "proven" themselves.
The U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet meeting in December, 1968 "elected" a Com-
mittee on Youth Affairs in each Council. Tyazhelnikov was elected to the
Council of the Union's committee and Boris Pastukhov (a Y.C.L. Central Com-
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Meetings of the Supreme Soviet committees were held in early 1969. Lower
113level Soviets also established Committees on Youth Affairs. Apparently,
the idea of the Committees was hastily conceived since the "tasks" of the
114Supreme Soviet Committees were not published until December, 1969.
Those "promotions" to the loyal Y.C.L. members who had proven them-
selves came rapidly. In May, 1969 it was noted in a joint meeting of the
Supreme Soviet Committees on Youth Affairs that almost 500,000 young people
had been elected to local Soviets in recent elections — this represented
one-fourth of all the Deputies to the local Soviets. It also was an in-
crease of about 150,000 Deputies over the statistics that had been quoted
at the Y.C.L. 50th Anniversary celebration. That the Y.C.L. was to main-
tain control over these Deputies was indicated by the statement:
To unify the efforts of the young Deputies in solving major
questions and to improve their leadership by city and district
Y.C.L, committees, Y.C.L. -Young Deputy groups are being set up
in the local Soviets. 117
On November 1, 1969, the higher Y.C.L. School was opened. It is the
first Y.C.L. higher educational institution and its stated purpose is edu-
118
eating its students "in the Marxist-Leninist world view."
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The only one of the Party's "proposals" for which evidence of imple-
mentation cannot be cited is the one concerning Party members' work with
the Y.C.L. The extent to which Party members were not interested in Y.C.L.
work was indicated in September, 1965 at a Moscow Province Party Committee
plenary meeting at which the number of Party workers in Y.C.L. organiza-
tions was reported to be declining — only 25 out of 105 secretaries of
Y.C.L. organizations were Communists. Only 2.5 percent of the Communists
119
under 30 years of age worked in the Y.C.L. Further, Brezhnev complained
at the XXIII Party Congress that "of the 2,500,000 Communists under the age
120
of 30, only about 270,000 work in the Y.C.L." No reports since then
have indicated that conditions have improved.
What are the effects of the increased concentration on ideology and
increased attention to the affairs of young people? What is the outlook
for the future?
The Communists will continue to be firmly entrenched in the U.S.S.R.
With the youth movement membership added to its membership, the CPSU con-
121
trols some 75 million of the 234 million population of the U.S.S.R.
Though they are not all activists, they are in some fashion or other com-
mitted to the present regime. Rarely are they found in the ranks of the
current Soviet dissenters who can be considered to represent only a small
portion of the population, albeit a vocal one (though they do not get the
122
mass media publicity that other countries give to their dissenters).
119
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Even the Soviet dissenters have no quarrel with the basic system, they just
123
want it to operate the way the written laws say it should. The Soviet
press has soundly criticized the practices of foreign youth that call for
destruction of the existing society, so it is apparent that they recognize
the threat such practices could represent if they developed in the Soviet
124
youth. Further indication of their concern about uncontrolled youth
groups comes from the articles that discuss how no youth group can exist
125
without Communist controls of some kind. Whenever one arises, it is taken
over or snuffed out rapidly. As the magazine Soviet Life said in November,
1969:
There are other mass youth organizations in the Soviet Union,
in the sports, the trades and professions, but there is no other
mass organization like the Komsomol. -^o
For the Communists it is far better to have an apolitical youth than
one that questions the values of the society that the Communists have built.
The new Soviet man may never be developed, but the regime appears willing
to appear to compromise or make concessions rather than polarize their
youth. The apolitical nature of most of the Soviet youth results in their
being swept along by the inertia of the Soviet system until they finally
take their place in the Soviet society. Public protest could ruin their
lives and careers, as the writers and active dissidents have found out.
This does not mean the Soviet system will not change; it already has
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from East Europe, more electronic communications forcing the regime to
127
reveal to its people more than ever before. All these contacts with
the outside world cannot help but add to the pressure on the regime for
the good life now . This brings up the crucial problem that the Communists
have failed to answer: who is going to run the Soviet Union in 1984 and
thereafter? The present Politburo of the CPSU is old and getting older —
128
the ages of its eleven members range from fifty-two to seventy-one.
The election of Tyazhelnikov can be viewed as more of the same attitude
— maintain control in the older ranks of the Party. The long term
effects can only be speculated about. If Tyazhelnikov lasts nine or ten
years, there can hardly be any doubt that the "generation gap" in the Y.C.L.
will become quite serious. This great gulf between the Party and Y.C.L.
leadership and the Soviet youth has not been overcome, nor does it appear
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CPSU Congresses Y.C.L. Congresses
I March 1-3, 1898 (old style)
II July 17-August 10, 1903
III April 12-27, 1905
IV April 10-25, 1906
V April 30-May 19, 1907
VI July 26-August 3, 1917
VII March 6-8, 1918 (new style)
VIII March 18-23, 1919
IX March 29-April 5, 1920
X March 8-16, 1921
XI March 27-April 2, 1922
XII April 17-25, 1923
XIII May 23-31, 1924
XIV December 18-31, 1925
- XV December 2-19, 1927
XVI June 26-July 13, 1930
XVII January 26-February 10, 1934
XVIII March 10-21, 1939
XIX October 5-15, 1952
XX February 14-25, 1956
XXI January 27-February 5, 1959
XXII October 17-31, 1961
XXIII March 29-April 8, 1966
1st October 29-November 4,
2nd October 5-8, 1919
3rd October 2-10, 1920
4th September 21-28, 1921
5th October 11-19, 1922
6th July 12-18, 1924
7th March 11-22, 1926
8th May 5-16, 1928
9th January 16-26, 1931
10th April 10-21, 1936
11th March 29-April 8, 1949
12th March 19-27, 1954
13th April 15-18, 1958
14th April 17-21, 1962
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1903 - Born, Moscow.
1914 - Went to work in a zinc-tin factory.
1918 - Joined Komsomol.
1918 - Went to the front as a volunteer.
1919 - Member All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
.
1920-
1926 Secretary of Bauman raikom's Komsomol in Moscow, Moscow-Narvsk
Raikom's Komsomol in Leningrad and Penza gubkom (Guberniia com-
mittee) Komsomol.
1924 - Elected delegate of the 13th Congress of the Party and was a
delegate of all the subsequent All-Union Party Congresses.
1925 - Participated in exposure and defeat of counter-revolutionary
Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition.
1926 - Elected secretary of Moscow Committee's Komsomol.
1927 - Secretary of the Central Committee of Ail-Union Komsomol.
1927 - Elected member of Central Control Commission of the Party.
1929 - Elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of Leninist
Komsomol
.
1930 - Elected candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-
Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
1933 - Awarded the Order of Lenin.
1934 - Elected full member of the Central Committee of the Ail-Union
Communist Party.
1934 - Member of Orgbureau of Central Committee of the All-Union Com-
munist Party.
From the time of the 5th All-Union Congress of Soviets, Kosarev was
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1922 - 1932 Worked at "Serp i Molot" (Hammer and Sickle) Metallurgical
Plant, Moscow.
1930 - Member of CPSU.
1932 - 1937 Was elected secretary of the Party Organ, Production
Training Unit, "Hammer and Sickle," then worked as the editor
of the factory's newspaper "Martenovka" ; Head Press Department
Proletarsky Raikom of the Party of Moscow City; as an editor
of the newspaper "Dinamo."
1937 - Editorial Staff of newspaper "Pravda."
1937 - 1938 Executive Editor of "Komsomol 'skaia Pravda."
1938 - 1952 First Secretary of the CC of Komsomol.
1939 - Member of the CC CPSU, Member of Orgbureau.
1952 - 1953 Secretary of the CC CPSU, member of the Presidium of the
CC CPSU, simultaneously Head, Department of Propaganda and Agi-
tation, CC CPSU.
1953 - Not elected to post-Stalin Presidium.
1953 - 1954 First Secretary of Moscow Obkom of the CPSU.
1954 - 1955 U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the Polish People's Republic.
1955 - 1969 Council member, Interparliamentary Union.
1955 - 1960 Minister of Culture of the U.S.S.R.
1960 - 1963 U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia.
1965 - 1969 Chairman of the Committee for Press attached to the Council
of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
1966 - Awarded the Order of Lenin.





Prominent Personalities in the U.S.S.R. (Metuchen, N. J. : The Scare-
crow Press, Inc., 1968), p. 408.






1918 - Born in Voronezh
1936 - 1939 Took part in purges, then Secretary Komsomol Organ, Moscow
Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature.
1939 - 1940 Political Officer, then squadron commander in Soviet Army
on Finnish Front
.
1940 - Member, CP
.
1940 - 1943 Instructor, then Secretary and Head, Department of Propa-
ganda and Agitation, Moscow City Committee Ail-Union Komsomol.
1941 - Graduated Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature.
1943 - 1952 Secretary, then Second Secretary CC, All-Union Komsomol.
1945 - 1953 Member, All-Union Committee for Physical Training and Sport,
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.
1951 - Deputy RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 1951 Convocation.
1952 - 1958 First Secretary, CC, Ail-Union Komsomol.
1952 - Member, CC, CPSU.
1954 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1954 Convocation.
1954 - Directed mobilization of 350,000 Komsomol members for development
of virgin lands.
1954 - Member Commission for Foreign Affairs, Soviet of Nationalities of
1954 Convocation.
1956 - Supervised mobilization of 300,000 youths and girls for "building
Communism" in Siberia, northern U.S.S.R. and Far East.
1956 - CPSU Congress, and member, Commission for Examining Amendments
and Additions to the 1956 CPSU Congress Draft Directive on the
6th Five-Year Plan for Development of U.S.S.R. Economy.
1957 - Organized dispatch of 650,000 Komsomol secondary school leavers
to work in stock-raising; initiated "voluntary" monetary contri-
butions by Komsomol members for benefit of state (3,000 million
rubles for 40th Anniversary of Oct. Revolution; 5,000 million
rubles for 13th Ail-Union Komsomol Congress) as well as militariza-
tion of Komsomol and enlistment of all Komsomol members for
DOSAAF Activities.
1958 - Department head, CC, CPSU.
1958 - 1961 Chairman, Committee for State Security, U.S.S.R. Council
of Ministers.
1958 - Member, Central Commission for Elections to U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet.
1958 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1958 Convocation.
1959 - Member, CC, CPSU, and U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet delegation to
Peking for 10th Anniversary of Chinese Peoples' Republic.
1961 - 1967 Secretary, CC, CPSU.
1962 - 1965 Deputy Chairman U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.
1962 - 1965 Chairman, Committee for Party and State Control, CC, CPSU,
and U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.
1962 - Headed CPSU delegation to Hungary.




Aleksandr Nikolaevich Shelepin (Cont'd)
1964 - 1966 Presidium member CC, CPSU.
1965 - Headed CPSU delegation to Mongolia and North Korea.
1966 - Headed Soviet delegation to North Vietnam and CPSU delegation
to Mongolia.
1966 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1966 Convocation.
1966 - Politbureau member, CC, CPSU.
1967 - Deputy, RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 1967 Convocation.
1967 - 1969 Chairman, Ail-Union Central Trade Union Council.
Member, Constitutional Commission.
Awards: Two Orders of Lenin; Two Orders of Red Star.
References:
Prominent Personalities in the U.S.S.R. (Metuchen, N.J. : The Scare-
crow Press, Inc., 1968), p. 561.







1941 - 1942 Studied at Kemerovo Chemical Technological Institute.
1941 - 1959 Executive Komsomol posts.
1944 - Member, CP.
1945 - 1946 Second, Then First Secretary Donets Oblast Committee
Ukrainian Komsomol.
1946 - 1950 Secretary, then First Secretary, CC, Ukrainian Komsomol.
1949 - 1952 Member and Candidate Member, Orgbureau, CC, CP Ukraine.
1950 - 1958 Secretary Ail-Union Komsomol.
1951 - Deputy Ukrainian Supreme Soviet of 1951 Convocation.
1955 - Deputy RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 1955 Convocation.
1956 - 1964 Candidate Member, CC, CPSU.
1958 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1958 Convocation.
1958 - 1959 First Secretary CC, All-Union Komsomol.
1958 - Member of Commission for Foreign Affairs, Soviet of the Union
of 1958 Convocation.
1958 - Headed All-Union Komsomol delegation at 6th Yugoslav Nar.
Youth Congress.
1959 - Head, Party Organs Dept. for Union Republics, CC, CPSU.
1959 - Elected Honorary Member, All-Union Komsomol*
1959 - Voting Delegate at 1959 CPSU Congress.
1959 - 1961 Second Secretary and Bureau Member CC, CP Azerbaijan.
1961 - 1967 Chairman, Committee of State Security, U.S.S.R. Council
of Ministers.
1962 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1962 Convocation.
1964 - Member CC, CPSU.
1966 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1966 Convocation.
1966 - Delegate at 1966 CPSU Congress.
1967 - First Deputy, Ukraine Chairman of Council of Ministers.
Committee member, U.S.S.R. Parliamentary Group; member, Constitution
Commission.
Awards: Order of Lenin; Order of Red Banner of Labor.
*The only First Secretary to be elected as an honorary member of Y.C.L.
He was elected after he left the Y.C.L.
References
:
Prominent Personalities in the U.S.S.R. (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scare-
crow Press, Inc., 1968), p. 546.







1941 - Head Librarian (no information as to where)
,
1944 - 1945 Worked in Military Hospital.
1949 - Graduated agricultural mechanization technicum.
1950 - 1952 Studied at Moscow Institute of Physical Training.
1952 - 1955 Secretary Krasnogvardeysky Rayon All-Union Komsomol Committee,
Moscow.
1954 - Member CP.
1955 - Department Head, Moscow City All-Union Komsomol Committee.
1955 - 1956 Secretary, Moscow City Ail-Union Komsomol Committee.
1956 - 1957 Second Secretary, Moscow City Ail-Union Komsomol Committee.
1957 - 1958 First Secretary, Moscow City All-Union Komsomol Committee.
1958 - 1959 Second Secretary, CC, All-Union Komsomol.
1959 - Deputy RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 1959 Convocation.
1959 - 1968 First Secretary CC, All-Union Komsomol.
1959 - Headed Soviet delegation to Youth Festival, Vienna.
1960 - Member, Soviet Youth delegation to Guinea.
1960 - Medal "For Valiant Labor."
1961 - Headed All-Union Komsomol delegation to Cuba, member of CC,CPSU.
1962 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1962 Convocation.
1962 - Member Foreign Affairs Commission, Soviet of the Union of 1962
Convocation.
1962 - Headed Soviet delegation to Youth Festival, Helsinki.
1962 - Member, U.S.S.R. Party and government delegation to Bulgaria.
1963 - Headed All-Union Komsomol delegation at Congress of East German
youth organizations.
1964 - Headed Soviet Youth delegation to Italy.
1966 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1966 Convocation.
June, 1968 - Chairman, Central Council of Union of Sports Societies and
Organization.
November, 1968 - Chairman of the Committee for Physical Culture and Sport
of the Council of Ministers.
Awards: Medal "For Valiant Labor," 1960.
References
:
Prominent Personalities in the U.S.S.R. (Metuchen, N.J. : The Scare-
crow Press, Inc., 1968), p. 473.
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Secretary of the Party bureau of the Chelyabinsk Pedagogic
Institute.
19587-1961?
Taught history at Chelyabinsk Pedagogic Institute.
1961 - 1964
Rector of Chelyabinsk Pedagogic Institute.
1964 - 1968
Secretary of Communist Party Committee in Chelyabinsk Province.
1968 - Present
First Secretary of Komsomol.
Dec. 1968 -





June 13, 1968, p. 7.
Christian Duevel, "Shake-up of the Komsomol Leadership," Radio
Liberty Dispatch (June 18, 1968).
CDSP
,
XX, No. 51, p. 8-9.
The dates with question marks may be the correct ones, but no definite




















May Day, 1964 100 101 102* 109
Oct. Rev, ,
,
1964 101 102 103* 110
May Day, 1965 104 105 106* 113
Oct. Rev,., 1965 103 104 105* 112
May Day, 1966 103 104 105 111
Oct. Rev,
,
, 1966 100 101 102 108
May Day, 1967 98 99 100 106
Oct. Rev,
,
, 1967 24 25 26 57
May Day, 1968 15 33 34 52
Oct. Rev, , , 1968 16** 35 36 55
May Day
,
1969 16 37 38 57





XVI, No. 15, p. 14-16.
XVI, No. 41, p. 7-8.
XVII, No. 16, p. 3-5.
XVII, No. 43, p. 3-5.
XVIII, No. 15, p. 21-23.
XVIII, No. 42, p. 7-9.
XIX, No. 16, p. 12-14.
XIX, No. 41, p. 3-4.
XX, No. 16, p. 10-11.
XX, No. 41, p. 13.
XXI, No. 16, p. 9-10.
XXI, No. 42, p. 10.
*The next slogan referred to "Communists and Y.C.L. members!"
The Y.C.L. reference was dropped in May Day Slogans for 1966 and never
reappeared.
**Number 17 was a one time slogan on the subject of Y.C.L. 's
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